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INTRODUCTION
There is a burgeoning privacy crisis due in large part to the explo-
sive growth of the Internet.' In large measure, this crisis has emerged in
; Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law. J.D., Yale Uni-
versity; M.A. (Public Policy), University of Chicago; Ph.D. (Philosophy), University of
Illinois at Chicago; B.A., University of Wisconsin. Earlier portions of this Article were pre-
sented at a symposium entitled "Taking Stock: The Law and Economics of Intellectual
Property Rights," at Vanderbilt Law School, at a symposium on the need for a federal pri-
vacy commission at the John Marshall Law School, and at a faculty workshop at Vanderbilt
Law School. I wish to gratefully acknowledge the numerous helpful comments received on
those occasions. In addition, Robert Rasmussen provided comments. I also wish to thank the
members of my Spring 2000 Advanced Regulation of the Internet course at Vanderbilt Law
School, where many of the ideas in the article were first explored. Finally, I am especially
grateful for the research assistance of Robert Brewer, Mark Plotkin, Linda Potapova and
Angela Vitale.
1. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (June
1998), available at http:llwww.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23a.pdf [hereinafter 1998 FTC
REPORT TO CONGRESS] ("While American businesses have always collected some
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a legal vacuum, as there is little positive law that directly regulates the
private collection of personal data.2 Because of this legal vacuum, in-
formal social norms have the potential to play an especially important
role in the regulation of data collection online This Article studies the
emergence of website norms pertaining to data collection that have
emerged in the past decade. In particular, the Article focuses on the
manner in which the government has sought to regulate online privacy
at a distance, purportedly out of respect for the established norm of In-
ternet self-regulation. 4 This case study of the emergence of online norms
information from consumers in order to facilitate transactions, the Internet allows for the
efficient, inexpensive collection of a vast amount of information. It is the prevalence, ease,
and relative low cost of such information collection that distinguishes the online
environment from more traditional means of commerce and information collection and thus
raises consumer concerns."). Emerging online technologies make the transmission of data
virtually costless, which has contributed to a situation in which dramatically higher levels of
personal data are now flowing across the Internet. Peter Huber and Mark P. Mills have
estimated that it takes "about 1 pound of coal to create, package, store and move 2
megabytes of data." Peter W. Huber, Dig More Coal-the PCs are Coming, FORBES (May
31, 1999), available at http:llwww.forbes.com/forbes/99/0531/6311070a.htm.
2. See also Maureen S. Dorney, Privacy and the Internet, 19 HASTINGS CoAiu. & ENT.
L.J. 635, 639 (1997) (explaining that because the Constitution primarily regulates govem-
ment action, it does not prohibit private party collection and use of personal information).
3. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWs OF CYBERSPACE 85-90 (1999)
(distinguishing four principal regulators of human behavior in cyberspace: norms, law, tech-
nology, and the market); see also Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52
STAN. L. REv. 1125, 1126 (2000) (endorsing Lessig's four-part approach to regulation in
context of privacy).
4. The Federal Trade Commission has stated that "self-regulation is the least intrusive
and most efficient means to ensure fair information practices, given the rapidly evolving
nature of the Internet and computer technology." See FEDERAL TRADE CONmUSSION, SELF
REGULATION AND PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 6 (July 1999), available at
http:l/vww.ftc.gov/os/1999/9907/privacy99.pdf [hereinafter 1999 FTC REPORT TO CON-
GRESS]; see LESSIG, supra note 3, chap. 1 (lengthy discussion of dominant anti-regulatory
outlook regarding governance of the Internet). Numerous commentators have taken the view
that since the Internet is growing so rapidly and successfully, it is sensible to be cautious
before adopting any significant regulatory measures that might curtail this development. See,
e.g., I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace," 55 U. PITT. L. REv. 993,
1054 (1994) (contending that rules of conduct in cyberspace should be governed by pre-
sumption of decentralization, using self-help, custom, and contract of cyberspace
participants, and noting that because the Internet is changing so rapidly, the first answer to
how a legal problem in cyberspace should be solved is to "do nothing"); Henry H. Perritt, Jr.,
Cyberspace Self-Government: Town Hall Democracy or Rediscovered Royalism?, 12 BER-
KELEY TECH. L.J. 413, 419-20 (1997) (contending that as a general rule "self-governance is
desirable for electronic communities"). In addition, because the Internet is an inherently
transnational phenomenon, it may be improper and overreaching for particular nations to
attempt to exert too great an influence over its development. See, e.g., David R. Johnson &
David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367
(1996); see also John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace
(visited Jan. 28, 2000), available at http://www.eff.org/-barlow/Declaration-Final.htm; A.
Michael Froomkin, The Internet as a Source of Regulatory Arbitrage, in BORDERS IN CY-
BERSPACE 129 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1997) (discussing the Internet's
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is of interest in its own right. It is intended, as well, to be instructive
regarding the possibilities for more effective regulation of online pri-
vacy, on a going forward basis.
The vast majority of commercial websites use their interactions with
consumers as the occasion to collect personal data about these consum-
ers.' The connection between the collection of personal data and
personal privacy is straightforward; the more personal data that websites
collect, store, and use, the less privacy that data subjects have. This re-
duction in privacy may be justified if the data subjects agree to
exchange their personal information for something they prefer more.
Typically, however, personal data has been taken by websites without
the subject's knowledge or consent Commercial websites behave in
this morally dubious, but commercially reasonable manner for two rea-
sons. First, personal data is not owned and hence it is not unlawful to
collect it without consent, and second, in the emerging digital economy,
personal data is becoming increasingly valuable. Given these facts, it is
no surprise that commercial websites collect and use as much personal
"resistance to control"); James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty,
and Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 177, 178-83 (1997) (noting the cyber-utopian
argument that "the technology of the medium, the geographical distribution of its users, and
the nature of its content all make the Internet specially resistant to state regulation").
5. There are two broad information categories of personal data: information that can be
used to identify consumers, such as name, postal or e-mail address ("personal identifying
information"); or demographic and preference information (such as age, gender, income
level, hobbies, or interests) that can be used either in aggregate, non-identifying form for
purposes such as market analysis, or in conjunction with personal identifying information to
create detailed personal profiles. See 1998 FTC REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 20. It
is the first sort of threat that particularly raises privacy concerns, for the reason that once
others have information about a person's identity, they may use the information in new ways
that adversely affect the person.
6. See Samuelson, supra note 3, at 1128 (discussing utilitarian and autonomy-based
rationales for regulation of data collection).
7. ANNE WELLS BRANSCOMB, WHO OWNS INFORIMATION? 3-4 (1994) ("A great deal of
information we consider to be highly personal, and of interest to ourselves and the town
gossip-our names, telephone numbers, marital status, educational accomplishments, job
and credit histories, even medical, dental, and psychiatric records-is now being sold on the
open market to anyone who believes he or she might be able to use such information to turn
a profit. These transactions usually take place without our knowledge or consent.").
8. See Online Privacy, Bus. WEEK, Mar. 20, 2000, available at 2000 WL 7825258
(comparing the stockpiles of information to an Internet gold rush); Kathryn Kranhold &
Michael Moss, Companies Are Refusing to Share Their Cookies Tracking Devices' Con-
sumer Data Is Too Precious, CHICAGO TRIB., Apr. 10, 2000, available at 2000 WL 3654616
(discussing how large Fortune 500 companies are protecting online tracking devices from
Internet advertising companies because consumer data is a veritable "gold mine"); Melissa
Preddy, Metro Teenagers Take Bait, Hook Prize on the Net-The Yield on Privacy in Bid for
College Cash, DETROIT NEWS, June 15, 2000, available at 2000 WL 348130 (stating
"personal information is like gold," especially to "get paid to surf," profiling websites that
entice Internet users to give up information about themselves for rewards).
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data as possible, and at a growing rate.9 Due to a torrent of media expo-
sure, there is a growing public awareness of the data-collection norms of
the website industry, and the ramifications of these norms for personal
privacy.'°
Public awareness of this erosion in privacy has precipitated public
outrage. Opinion polls show increasing public concern with respect to
online privacy.1 This outrage sets the stage for rapid policy shifts by
private industry and lawmakers alike. The United States Congress in-
creasingly has shown an interest in enacting omnibus privacy
legislation. 2 The Federal Trade Commission repeatedly has articulated
an interest in regulating online data collection. 3 Although increased
governmental regulation of online privacy likely will ensue, norms and
customs will continue to play a significant role due to the continued
strength of the norm favoring Internet self-regulation. 14
Because of the importance of informal social and industry norms in
regulating privacy in cyberspace, this topic presents a natural arena for
the application of "law and norms" theory. Laws and norms theory is
arguably the most important development in contemporary law and
9. See Erika S. Koster, Zero Privacy: Personal Data on the Internet, THE COMPUTER
LAW., May 1999, at 7-8 (noting that commercial activity involving personal data is growing
rapidly).
10. See, e.g., The End of Privacy: The Surveillance Society, ECONOMIST, May 1, 1999,
at 21 (covering privacy degradation in online environment); Rep. Asa Hutchinson and Rep.
Jim Moran, Commission is First Step to Privacy, ROLL CALL, July 10, 2000, available at
http://www.rollcall.com; Adam L. Penenberg, The End of Privacy, FoRBEs, Nov. 29, 1999,
available at 1999 WL 28466750; Jared Sandberg, Identity Thieves Online, NEwSWEEK, Sept.
20, 1999, available at 1999 WL 19354964; Celia Santander, Web-Site Privacy Policies
Aren't Created Equal, WEB FINANCE, Dec. 11, 2000.
II. See Glenn R. Simpson, E-Commerce Finns Start to Rethink Opposition to Privacy
Regulation as Abuses, Anger Rise, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2000, at A24. A recent U.S. Business
Week/Harris Poll found that 92 per cent of Internet users were uncomfortable about websites
sharing personal information with other sites. See Online Privacy, supra note 8.
12. N.Y. TIMEs, June 8, 2000, at A5 (strategists for major political parties analyze best
means to capitalize on voter concern for online privacy). The lobbying muscle of the infor-
mation industry suggests, however, that any such laws would stop short of providing a level
of privacy deemed adequate by privacy advocates. See Jessica Litman, Information Pri-
vacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1283, 1287 (2000).
13. See Steven Hetcher, The FTC as Internet Privacy Norm Entrepreneur, 53 VAND. L.
REv. 2041, 2043 (2000).
14. FEDERAL TRADE COMIlSSION, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN
THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE, A REPORT TO CONGRESS (May 2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2OOO/privacy2OOO.pdf [hereinafter 2000 FTC REPORT TO
CONGRESS] (recommending continued support of self-regulatory approach along with legis-
lation); see also Rep. Billy Tauzin, How Can Congress Protect Online Privacy? Self-
Regulation is Key to Web Privacy, ROLL CALL, Feb. 22, 1999, available at http://
www.rollcall.com (confident that Internet was moving in right direction to make self-
regulation a reality).
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economics. 5 Analytic social norms theory entered the law with the pub-
lication in 1991 of Robert Ellickson's book, Order Without Law.
16
Based on empirical studies of ranching and farming communities in
Northern California, Ellickson developed the hypothesis that efficient
norms will emerge in "close-knit communities."' 7 These norms will
serve as solutions to the iterated "collective-action problems" faced by
the group. 8
With regard to Ellickson's hypothesis, the Internet may present an
especially difficult context for the emergence of efficient norms, how-
ever, as online participants would appear to be anything but close-knit. 9
The apparent implication is that website privacy norms are inefficient as
they are the product of communities that are not close-knit.20 Thus,
while these norms indeed are emerging rapidly, there is reason to con-
clude that they are not moving toward greater efficiency. The task at
hand, then, is not only to examine how and why website privacy norms
are emerging, but also to evaluate and hopefully improve their effi-
ciency.
15. Judge Richard Posner views law and norms theory as second-generation law and
economics. Richard A. Posner, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and Economic Analysis of
Law: A Comment, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 553 (1998). Ellickson views law and norms as repre-
senting a new paradigm within the traditional law and economic approach. Robert C.
Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537 (1998).
Social norms theory has been the subject of a number of important recent symposia. See
Symposium, Law, Economics, and Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643 (1996); Symposium,
Law and Society & Law and Economics, Wis. L. REv. 375 (1997); Symposium, The Nature
and Sources, Formal and Informal, of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 947 (1997). Symposium,
VIRGINIA L. REv. (2000); see also Symposium, The Informal Economy, 103 YALE L. REv.
2119 (1994).
16. ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HoW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
(1991).
17. Id. at 137.
18. RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE AcTION (1982).
19. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997) (J. Stevens, dissenting) ("Taken to-
gether, these tools constitute a unique medium-known to its users as 'cyberspace'-located
in no particular geographical location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world, with
access to the Internet."); Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 168-69 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) ("Typically, states' jurisdictional limits are related to geography; geography, however,
is a virtually meaningless construct on the Internet."); Dan L. Burk, Trademark Doctrines for
Global Electronic Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REv. 695, 716 (1998) ("Notwithstanding that the
Internet is and will be segmented by economic, social, and technological divisions, those
divisions will not necessarily map onto the geographic, political, and economic divisions
already existing offline ... the current technological structure of the Internet ... ignores
customary political and geographical boundaries on which much of our legal system is
based.").
20. See Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 CHL-KENT L.
REv. 1257, 1275 (1998) (author dubious of claim that Internet norms are efficient).
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The concept of "privacy" is itself generally understood in rights-
based terms.2 In an online context, there is frequent discussion of the
need for greater "respect" for privacy. Phrased simply, respect is a de-
ontological concept. Despite the rhetorical focus on deontological
concepts, the emergence of online privacy norms that has occurred over
the last decade is equally well described as a move toward a more effi-
cient regime of regulation of the flow of personal data. One of the goals
of the following discussion will be to establish a "compatibility thesis"
with regard to privacy and utility.' The crucial norms that have emerged
in the website industry are both more efficient and more respectful of
privacy.
The compatibility between efficiency and privacy has been possible
because respect for data privacy has been cashed out in terms of auton-
omy. Respect for privacy does not require minimizing the amount of
personal data that is collected and processed.f Rather, it requires that
data collection and processing not violate the autonomy of the data
subject. Data collection that is respectful of autonomy is accomplished
through the mechanism of consentY When data subjects consent to the
use and collection of their data by websites, then the websites are col-
lecting data in a manner that respects the autonomy of the data subjects.
These exchanges of data for valuable consideration are also productive
of social utility because through exchange each party is able to receive
something it prefers more by trading away something it prefers less.
21. See, e.g., Simon G. Davies, Re-engineering the Right to Privacy: How Privacy Has
Been Transformed from a Right to a Commodity, in TECHNOLOGY & PRIVACY 143-45 (Philip
E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997) (noting a change in society's approach from privacy
protection to data protection); Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information
Practice in the U.S. Private Sector, 80 IowA L. REv. 497, 497-498 (1998) (arguing that a
citizen's right to participate in government depends "on the ability to control the disclosure
of personal information"); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52
VAND. L. REv. 1609, 1611 (1999) (claiming that the absence of privacy norms threatens
democracy); see also Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at Copy-
right Management in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. Rav. 981, 982-83 (1996) (arguing that
digital copyright management technologies violate First Amendment Rights protecting
speech and freedom of thought). The EU Directive is based on a conception of personal data
protection as a fundamental civil liberty interest. Council Directive 95/46/EEC, art. 1.1, 1995
O.J. (L 281) 281 [hereinafter Privacy Directive].
22. Pamela Samuelson, supra note 3, at 1128 n. 18 ("It is therefore both unnecessary
and counterproductive to choose between, e.g., the market-based and civil liberty-based
visions of privacy.").
23. Minimization of data collection is sometimes stated as the goal of privacy regula-
tion. See, e.g., Litman, supra note 12.
24. See Samuelson, supra note 3, at 1156-58.
[Vol. 7:97
The Emergence of Website Privacy Norms
Part I of th. Article will first look at the original privacy norms that
emerged at the Web's inception in the early 1990s. 5 Two groups have
been the main contributors to the emergence of these norms; the thou-
sands of commercial websites on the early Web, on the one hand, and
the millions of users of the early Web, on the other hand. The main
structural feature of these norms was that websites benefitted through
the largely unrestricted collection of personal data while consumers suf-
fered injury due to the degradation of their personal privacy from this
data collection. In other words, degradation of consumer privacy re-
sulted as a third-party externality of free-market data-collection norms
of the website industry. 26 Broadly speaking, then, these injuries occurred
in a tort context as the injurers and victims were not in a bargaining re-
lationship with regard to the injurer's procurement of the victim's
personal data.27
Next, Part I will examine the strategic structure of the relationships
between websites and consumers that allowed these highly exploitative
norms to flourish. Analysis will indicate that consumers faced a large-
scale collective action problem. There is a collective good that consum-
ers potentially could have achieved, namely, the abatement of
disrespectful data-collection practices by websites. Web users would
have great difficulty in organizing to secure this collective good, how-
ever, due to their large numbers and lack of repeat play and overlapping
relationships.2
Reacting to this sub-optimal but stable social situation, "norm
entrepreneurs" entered the picture.' Three main types of norm
entrepreneurs have been involved: public-interest advocates, website
industry advocates, and governmental actors, particularly the Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC"). Part II will examine how new, more
25. The Web is that portion of the Internet that runs HTTP, TCP/IP and utilizes uniform
resource locators. Tim BERNERS-LEE, WEAVING THE WEB (1999).
26. See PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YoUR BUSINESS: WORLD DATA
FLows, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIREcTIvE 8 (1998). Yet
another feature of the complex normative story behind the convergence of Internet privacy
norms has to do with the recognition of entitlements in personal data. At the beginning of the
period under study there was a divergence between the legal recognition of entitlements to
personal data and the informal social norms that existed with respect to this data. Over the
decade, the law has come to more closely represent the informal norms of entitlement.
27. The tortious relationship between the parties is itself expressed in deontological
terms of unfair competition and breach of confidentiality. See Samuelson, supra note 3, at
1154-1157.
28. By the lights of standard game theory, large-scale collective action problems are the
most difficult to solve. See generally HARDIN, supra note 18; ELLICKSON, supra note 16.
29. Norm entrepreneurs are actors who promote norms. Cass Sunstein, Social Norms
and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 909 (1996).
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respectful website privacy norms recently have begun to emerge, due
largely to the efforts of these norm entrepreneurs.
The following study of the impact of norm entrepreneurs on website
privacy norms will reveal a highly significant event. In the short history
of the Internet, there has been a major shift-a "norm-cascade"-
toward more respectful privacy norms.3" The transition has been from a
wild-west world in which websites did almost whatever they wanted
with impunity, to a world in which a significant percentage of websites
are explicitly addressing privacy concerns.
Part II models the norm cascade toward greater respect for online
privacy in two stages. In the first stage, the privacy advocacy commu-
nity and the website industry are described as battling to define the
appropriate set of aspirational norms that should govern website/
consumer interactions.3 The privacy advocacy community began to
form in the 1960s to fight against wide-scale personal data collection
and aggregation by agencies of the U.S. government, newly armed with
mainframe computers. Norms of data privacy that emerged out of this
process subsequently have been adapted to an online context by Internet
rights advocacy groups. In response, the Website industry developed its
own set of suggested online privacy norms, which it promotes as alter-
natives to those offered by the public-interest, advocacy community.
In the second stage of the emergence account, the FTC is described
as first developing its own set of aspirational privacy norms, which it
labels the "fair information practice principles." These principles repre-
sent a compromise between the demanding norms proposed by the
advocacy community and the more permissive norms proposed by the
website industry. While the FTC invokes the rhetoric of fairness, its
proposed principles are best understood as promoting consensual data
exchanges between websites and consumers.
Having specified its own set of aspirational norms, the FTC next
sought to educate the public so that it would demand behavior on the
part of websites consistent with these norms. The FTC then issued a
threat to promote Congressional action in order to incentivize the
website industry to bring its behavior in line with the FTC's norms.
30. Id.
31. An "aspirational norm" is the linguistic expression of a putative norm, that is, an
expression regarding a practice that the speaker would like to see come into existence. Ste-
ven A. Hetcher, Creating Safe Social Norms in a Dangerous World, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1
(1999).
32. See DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES 306-
08 (1989); PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY-TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES
AND PUBLIC POLICY 70 (1995); Interview by Mary Kathleen Flynn with John Berard, Inter-
net Privacy Issues, CNNfn DIGITAL JAM (Feb. 5, 2000).
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Initially, the FTC's threat was more effective on the larger and more
established websites. Subsequently, however, these larger sites found it
in their interest to themselves introduce threats to bring about
compliance on the part of smaller sites. For example, large firms such as
IBM and Disney have threatened to withdraw advertising from affiliated
sites that fail to provide a minimal threshold of privacy protection.3 The
result of this network of threats by the FTC and large websites was the
creation of a new equilibrium in which there was no longer a uniform
norm of disrespect for privacy as existed in Stage One, but instead a bi-
normative world in which numerous sites conformed to disrespectful
practices while other sites conformed to more respectful practices. In
this bi-normative world, an increasing number of sites provided
"privacy policies" that could be linked to, from the site's home page.'
Some sites, however, went farther by adopting privacy specialists within
the firm. In fact, as growing numbers of Fortune 500 companies are
creating a new position in the executive suite: the Chief Privacy
Officer.5
Taken together, the two stages described above produced a regime
of data-gathering based to a greater extent on exchange relationships.
Privacy policies put consumers on notice of the data practices of
websites. This puts consumers in a position to choose whether or not to
take part in the data exchange, depending on the conditions of the bar-
gain. The current situation is far from ideal, however, as many websites
have failed to adopt more respectful privacy practices. Worse yet, other
firms have endorsed such practices in word but not in deed, by posting
privacy policies on their sites but regularly violating the terms of these
policies.3 ' This may be worse than providing no privacy assurances at
33. See infra text accompanying notes 108-12.
34. See Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REv. 815, 823
(2000) (defining a privacy policy as a document that is often accessed through a hypertext
link on a homepage which spells out how it collects and uses personal information).
35. An in-house lawyer representing Novell, speaking at the tenth annual Computers,
Freedom & Privacy Conference, Toronto, April 4-7, 2000, remarked on the rapid rise of
privacy specialists within large corporations such as hers. Universities have begun develop-
ing programs to train privacy specialists. See SMU Teams with Privacy Council: Announces
First Executive Chief Privacy Officer Training Program, FINANCIAL NEWS, Jan. 29, 2001;
see also David Bicknell, Directors Face E-Laws Overload, COMPUTER WEEKLY, Feb. 24,
2000, at 16 (the coordination of complying with European privacy policies has led some
companies to be pro-active and engaging in "self-help" through privacy specialists).
36. For example, in bankruptcy proceedings, Toysmart.com recently moved to sell per-
sonal data it had collected pursuant to a specific privacy guarantee. See Judge Is Urged to
Reject Toysmart.com Settlement, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2000, available at 2000 WL-WSJ
3037882; Toysmart.com's Plan To Sell Customer Data Is Challenged by FTC, WALL ST. J.,
July 11, 2000, available at 2000 WL-WSJ 3035966; FTC Announces Settlement With Bank-
rupt Website, Toysmart.com, Regarding Alleged Privacy Policy Violations, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/07/toysmart2.htm (July 21, 2000). While the FTC may settle,
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all, as users are lulled by a false sense of security. Still other websites
offer privacy policies that are so unclear in their meaning or complex in
their provisions that there may be no practical sense in which consumers
consent to these provisions. Nevertheless, on the whole, improvements
in the moral quality of the interaction between consumers and websites
have been made. Most important is the fact that overall an aspirational
grundnorm of respect for website data privacy has begun to emerge in
American culture generally. Only time will tell whether this grundnorm
can become more adequately instantiated in actual online practices.
It is important that the policy community better understand the me-
chanics whereby more respectful website privacy norms have emerged.
If better norms are already emerging through informal social processes
and minimalist governmental guidance, there may not be a need for
sweeping legislation of the sort currently being proposed by the FTC, as
well as by many privacy advocates who suggest that the United States
adopt the comprehensive European model of privacy regulation, despite
its evident tension with sacred free speech principles. 7
I. THE ORIGINAL WEBSITE PRIVACY NoRMs
The first subpart below describes the original privacy-related norms
that emerged in the unrestrained environment of the early Internet. The
second subpart utilizes informal game theory in order to analyze these
norms in terms of their strategic structures.
A. Norms of Unrestrained Data Gathering
The first message sent across the Internet occurred one month after
the moon landing in late 1969."8 In theory, from that moment onward,
the Internet could have been used by one person to impermissibly gather
personal data about another person. There is nothing in the historical
record to suggest, however, that the invasion of data privacy was a
problem in this early stage of the Internet's development. One reason
Toysmart still faces a lawsuit filed by TRUSTe, which contends that Toysmart is in violation
of its online agreement not to sell consumer data to third parties. See Elinor Abreu, TRUSTe
to File Antiprivacy Brief Against Toysmart, INDUSTRY STANDARD (June 30, 2000), available
at http://www.thestandard.com/article/display/0,1 151,16577,00.html; see also Susan E.
Gindin, Lost and Found in Cyberspace: Informational Privacy in the Age of the Internet, 34
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1153, 1180 (1997).
37. See Solveig Singleton, Privacy Versus the First Amendment: A Skeptical Approach,
11 FORDHAM INTL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 97, 98 (2000); Domingo R. Tan, Personal
Privacy in the Information Age: Comparison of Internet Data Protection Regulations in the
United States and the European Union, 21 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 661, 665.
38. STEPHEN SEGALLER, NERDs 2.0.1: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INTERNET 92 (1998).
The Emergence of Website Privacy Norms
may be that, in this early period, the Internet was mainly used by aca-
demic researchers working in shared disciplines.39 Such groups tend to
have fairly small numbers and overlapping, multiple interactions. In
Ellickson's terms, these were close-knit communities in which there
would have been internal incentives to deter opportunistic behavior.'
It took the occurrence of two events in the 1990s in order to set in
motion the series of developments that would lead to the current privacy
crisis. The first was the invention of the World Wide Web in the early
1990s by Tim Berners-Lee.4' Once the core features of the Web were in
place, the Internet became dramatically easier to use, and a vast flow-
ering of websites spurted up spontaneously and rapidly. These were not
electronic-commerce sites, however, as the National Science Founda-
tion did not then permit commercial use of the Internet.42 The Web was
not available for consumers until the Bush Administration zoned cyber-
space for commercial use.43 The commercialization of cyberspace is the
second event that precipitated the privacy crisis, as commercial websites
have been the main users of personal data collected under questionable
circumstances.
Early commercial website norms facilitated data collection in two
ways. First, many websites explicitly requested user information. Sec-
ond, many websites collected data that was produced as a byproduct of
website/consumer interactions, such as when consumers provided their
credit card numbers or mailing addresses to sites. With the introduction
of these online techniques of data-collection, the commodification of
personal data entered a phase of rapid acceleration, as each of these ini-
tial means of data collection was soon improved upon by websites."
39. Id. at Chapter Four.
40. Ellickson specifically mentions academic communities as often close-knit. ELLICK-
SON, supra note 16.
41. Ti t BERNERS-LEE, WEAVING THE WEB (1999).
42. See Segaller, supra note 38, at 224-25.
43. See id. at 297.
44. See generally MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 15 (1996); Margaret
Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in
Cyberspace, 73 CI.-KENT L. REv. 1295, 1302 (1998). The term "commodification" is not
inherently pejorative. Whether, and to what extent, the commodification of personal data is a
negative development depends on one's normative theory. For utilitarian theories generally, and
economic analysis in particular, "commodification," per se, has no sui generis moral meaning.
The core idea of this type of moral theory is that all things of value may be put on a single
scale. Thus, to commodify data, or anything else, is not to change its moral status. In fact,
economic theorists may view commodification as an instrumental good, as commodifying
data may promote efficiency by allowing this data to more easily reach the hands of those
who will value it most. For some versions of deontological theory, on the other hand, per-
sonal data may not morally be made the subject of market exchanges. See Samuelson, supra
note 3, at 1143 ("If information privacy is a civil liberty, it may make no more sense to prop-
ertize personal data than to commodify voting rights."). See generally Pamela S. Karlan, Not
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Regarding explicit requests for data, websites soon began condi-
tioning access to their sites, or to prized pages within their sites, on the
provision by website visitors of some personal data. For example, one
who wanted to receive the New York Times online had to fill out a de-
tailed data questionnaire first. Alternatively, users might receive
discounts, coupons, or free entry in contests as an inducement for the
provision of information.
Regarding the collection of data without consumer notice, websites
soon began to deploy sophisticated technological means of data gather-
ing, such as cookies." Cookie technology allows a website's server to
place information about a consumer's visits to the site on the user's
computer in a text file that only the website's server can read. In the
early period especially, because cookies were planted secretly and sub-
sequently operated seamlessly, Web users were typically unaware of the
fact that data about them was being gathered.46 In other words, there was
no bargain between the parties; the data was simply spirited away.47
When using cookies, a Website assigns each consumer a unique
identifier, 8 so that the consumer may be recognized in subsequent visits
By Money but By Virtue Won? Vote Trafficking and the Voting Rights System, 80 VA. L.
REV. 1455 (1994) (explaining rationale for public policies against vote trafficking). This
type of deontological theory, however, is not the type that is implicit in most discussions of
online privacy. Most deontologically-oriented discussions of privacy implicitly accept the
notion that under proper conditions, such as when there is informed consent, a data subject
my morally alienate personal data in a market exchange.
45. Neil Randal, How Cookies Work, PC MAGAZINE ONLINE, available at http:l
www.zdnet.com/pcmag/
ventures/cookie/cksl.htm (last visited July 4, 2000). There is a shortage of social scien-
tific information about cookie use. In its survey of Web sites, the FTC staff did not ascertain
whether sites use cookies, or other hidden electronic means, to collect personal information,
but looked instead to sites' information practice disclosures as a gauge of the extent of such
practices. See 1998 FrC REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 45 n. 4.
46. LESSIG, supra note 3, at 4-42.
47. See Andrew L. Shapiro, Privacy For Sale: Peddling Data on the Internet, Humi.
RTs., Winter, 1999, at 10.
48. Generally, a unique identifier is connected to the machine and not to a named indi-
vidual. The problem is that this is a small gap to bridge. Consequently, privacy advocates
have been concerned about unique identifiers even when connected to machines and not
individuals. See, e.g., Electronic Communications Privacy Policy Disclosures: Hearing Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Mark Rotenberg, Executive Director, Electronic
Privacy Information Center). Recently, both Intel and Microsoft have made efforts to tie
numbers to names. See Edward C. Baig, Privacy: The Internet Wants Your Personal htfo.
What's In It for You?, Bus. WEEK, April 5, 1999, available at 1999 WL 8226796; Don Clark
& Kara Swisher, Microsoft to Alter Windows 98 So Data About Users Won't Be Sent to
Company, WALL ST. J., March 8, 1999, available at 1999 WL-WSJ 5443409; Robert Lemos,
The Biggest Computer Bugs of 1999!, ZD INTERNET MAGAZINE, Dec. 23, 1999, available at
1999 WL 14538475 (discussing Intel's Pentium III serial number, global unique identifiers,
and two Microsoft products, Office 97 and Windows 98, that attempted to match various
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to the site.49 In this manner, the site engages in "passive tracking" of the
consumer." On each return visit, the site can call up user-specific in-
formation, which typically will include the consumer's preferences or
interests, as indicated by pages the consumer accessed in prior visits,
items the consumer clicked on while at the site, or information down-
loaded."' Cookies make it easier for firms to engage in highly targeted
marketing.52 Cookie technology has proven to be extremely valuable to
online companies because it not only enables merchants to target prod-
ucts and services that are increasingly tailored to consumer preferences
but it also permits other companies to boost their revenues by selling
more highly-valued advertising space on their web sites. 3 As Michael
Froomkin says, cookies are the tip of the iceberg.M Once firms collect
personal data, they may then aggregate it, or sell it to others who aggre-
gate it, into databases containing profiles of named individuals. For
example, a firm named Acxiom currently holds personal and financial
information about nearly all U.S., U.K., and Australian consumers."'
The personal-data norms of the early website industry are characterized
in the following list.
Personal-Data Norms of the Early Website Industry
1. Websites may freely gather as much personal data as desir-
able from consumers.
2. Websites need not ask permission to gather personal data.
numbers to personal information and names); see also In re the Matter of Intel Pentium
Processor Serial Number, Compl., Case No. 982 (Federal Trade Commission Feb. 26, 1999).
49. An industry has emerged to market a variety of software products designed to assist
websites in collecting and analyzing visitor data and in providing targeted advertising. See,
e.g., Rivka Tadher, Following the Patron Path, ZD INTERNET MAGAZINE, Dec. 23, 1997, at
95; Thomas E. Weber, Software Lets Marketers Target Web Ads, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21,
1997, atB1.
50. "Passive tracking" refers to information collected by using navigational software.
1998 FrC REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 56.
51. See id. at 3, 45.
52. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1461, 1487 (2000).
53. FORESTER RESEARCH, INC., MEDIA & TECHNOLOGY STRATEGIES: MAKING USERS
PAY 4-6 (1998).
54. Froomkin, supra note 52, at 1487 ("Cookies, however, are only the tip of the ice-
berg. Far more intrusive features can be integrated into browsers, into software downloaded
from the Internet, and into viruses or Trojan horses. In the worst case, the software could be
configured to record every keystroke."). A trojan horse is a "malicious, security-breaking
program that is disguised as something benign, such as a directory lister, archiver, game, or
... a program .... FOLDOC, Trojan Horse, available at http:llwombat.doc.ic.ac.uklfoldoc/
foldoc.cgi?query=+trojan+horse (last visited Mar. 25, 2001).
55. Froomkin, supra note 52, at 1473-74.
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3. Websites need not inform consumers of their data-gathering
practices.
4. Websites may use personal data in any manner they prefer,
such as selling or licensing it to third parties.
5. Websites need not allow consumers access to their data.
6. Websites need not provide security for personal data in their
possession.
The most striking feature of these early website personal-data norms
is that they were completely geared toward serving the interests of the
website industry. They reflect the fact that most websites felt neither
legal nor social pressure to respect the data privacy of the visitors to
their sites. 6 There was no legal pressure because there were no laws on
the books that clearly prescribed the above practices and there was little
social pressure because most people had little or no awareness that these
practices were taking place. 7 In other words, these norms did not reflect
any informal bargaining taking place between websites and consumers.
The fact that they emerged in a context in which there was a lack of
bargaining is the most salient feature of the personal-data norms of the
early website industry. Despite a lack of bargaining, there may be rea-
son to think these norms were efficient. They are potentially justifiable
from an economic perspective, as websites take something from the
public domain that was under utilized, and put it to productive use. Like
campers in a wooded area who collect fallen branches for use in their
campfires, websites, on this view, are simply making use of a common
resource that would otherwise be left lying in an unproductive state.
After all, great quantities of personal data are produced as a by-product
of other online activities. If not collected, this data would simply go un-
used. In fact, the economic argument in favor of shared use of personal
information is stronger than it is for downed wood. Personal data is a
"non-rival" good in the classic economic sense of the term; collection
and use of personal data by one website does not diminish the amount
available, either for other websites or for the data subject herself to
56. Mark A. Lemley, supra note 20, at 1276 ("[Non-consensual website interactions
are] particularly likely when incentives are asymmetrically distributed in the community, as
when buyers and sellers have their own conflicting norms. The norm that results from this
conflict may represent a variety of things besides consensus: superior bargaining power on
the prevailing side, collective action problems on the other side, or the use of strategic be-
havior.").
57. Ellickson emphasizes the important role that knowledge plays in the monitoring
process that allows for successful solution of strategic problems. ELLICKSON, supra note 16.
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use." Because data is non-rival, arguably it should be left unregulated so
that the greatest number of users will have free access to its use.
In this regard, note the important difference between personal data
and creative expression of the sort protected by copyright law. Creative
expression-original works of authorship-received legal protection,
pursuant to Article I of the U.S. Constitution, in order to create incen-
tives for authors to produce works. 9 Such an incentive is not necessary
for the production of personal data, however, as it is produced as a by-
product of living a life. Thus, there would appear to be a presumption in
favor of treating personal data as a public good available to all.
There is an important disanalogy, however, between personal data
and other shared goods such as fallen branches in a national forest. No
one need suffer an injury when downed wood is burned, whereas data
subjects often suffer significant harm when their personal information is
used by others. Commentators have noted a wide variety of harms that
may arise due to improper online data collection and use.
One type of harm is "identity theft." Identity theft occurs when one
person intentionally assumes another person's online identity. Thus far,
58. Patrick Croskery, Institutional Utilitarianism and Intellectual Property, 68 CHI-
KENT L. REV. 631, 632 (1993).
59. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. In the landmark case, Feist v. Rural Telephone
Senice, the Supreme Court has said that facts are not subject to copyright protection. Rather,
they must be left in the public domain-the intellectual commons-available for all to use.
499 U.S. 340 (1991). Feist involved facts of a particular sort, namely, personal data; the
names and addresses of the residents of a particular region of Kansas, as contained in a re-
gional telephone directory. See id. at 359-60. Lawyers are just beginning to grapple with
special issues raised by the digital commons. See LaSSIG, supra note 3; Steven Hetcher,
Climbing the Walls of Your Electronic Cage, 98 MICH. L. REv. 801, 814 (2000). Law re-
garding personal data, indeed all data, is at sea. Some commentators have argued for
heightened intellectual property status for personal data as a means to greater privacy pro-
tection. See Patricia Mell, Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual Sunlight: Privacy as
Property in the Electronic Wilderness, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 78 (1996) (advocating
statutory recognition of property rights in a "persona" consisting of personal information
about the individual); Kenneth C. Laudon, Markets and Privacy, COMt. ACM, Sept. 1996, at
92 (suggesting property rights in personal data as a way to protect privacy). There are First
Amendment, however, tensions with this sort of proposal. For a discussion of the First
Amendment and privacy, compare Paul M. Schawrtz, Free Speech v. Privacy: Eugene Vo-
loch's First Amendment Jurisprudence, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1559 (2000), with Eugene Volokh,
Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop
People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. LAW. REV. 1049 (2000). The tension between
privacy and free speech can be avoided if data-subject control, as opposed to ownership, of
personal data, can be protected. A trend leading in an opposite direction from heightened
intellectual property protection is "copyleft," which argues that the Internet radically under-
mines ownership concepts for intellectual goods in the online world. See Ira v. Heffan,
Copyleft: Licensing Collaborative Work in the Digital Age, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1487, 1491-92
(1997); see also DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE US TO
CHOOSE BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? (1998) (arguing that personal data should be
subject to open access rules).
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identity thieves have typically gone on shopping sprees at the expense
of their victims, but the possibilities for abuse through identity theft will
grow as the functionality of the Internet expandsi0 Another type of harm
that has received a good deal of attention is predation on children. Prior
to recent legislation, children were especially vulnerable to questionable
website practices. A wide variety of detailed personal information has
been collected online from children through various stratagems, such as
encouraging a child to register for a contest, enroll in an electronic "pen
pal" program, complete a survey, sign up for informational updates, or
play a game.62 Still other sites used "imaginary" characters to request
information from children, or had them sign a "guest book." 3 Data-
gathering norms of the early website industry, however, did not distin-
guish children from adults. All visitors were equally disrespected.
Alternatively, harms may result as the foreseen but unintended con-
sequences of mundane business operations, such as when firms use
private medical information of potential employees in making hiring
decisions. For example, one-third of Fortune 500 companies use per-
sonal medical information in hiring, promotion, or termination
decisions.Y This has the significant policy consequence that may people
are failing to seek medical diagnosis and treatment. 5
60. See, e.g., Jared Sandberg, supra note 10. Indicating the seriousness of the problem,
the FTC has recently appointed a person to handle the issue. See The Prepared Statement of
the Federal Trade Commission on "Identity Theft": Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
Technology, Terrorism and Government Information of the Senate Committee on the Judici-
ary, 105th Cong. (1998) (Statement of David Mendine, Ass'n Div. for Credit Practices,
Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission). A recently passed Identity
Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a), imposes a penalty of fifteen
years of imprisonment and fines for theft of personal information with intent to commit an
unlawful act. See Kurt M. Saunders and Bruce Zucker, Counteracting Identity Fraud in the
Information Age: The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, 8 CORNELL J.L. &
PUBL. POL'Y 20 (1999); Peter P. Swire, Financial Privacy and the Theory of High-Tech
Government Surveillance, WASH. U. L. Q. 461, 470-74 (giving examples); see also
Laracuente v. Laracuente, 599 A.2d 968 (N.J. Lav Div. 1991) (showing typical social secu-
rity number identity theft).
61. Discussions pertaining to the special concerns regarding data collection from chil-
dren often mention the inability of children to effectively consent to such data collection.
This demonstrates a special concern for the autonomy, or lack thereof, of children.
62. See 1998 FTC REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 4-5.
63. Id.
64. See Jane Birubaum, Here's How to Protect Your Medical Records, CHICAGO TRIB.,
Nov. 23, 1999, available at 1999 WL 2935001; David F. Linanes & Ray Apencer, How
Employers Handle Employees' Personal Information: Report of a Recent Survey, 1 Em-
PLOYEE RTS. & EMPLOYMENT POL'Y J. 153 (1997).
65. See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics of Personal Health Care Infor-
mation, 76 TEx. L. REv. 1, 22 (1997) ("[V]ide disclosure of certain kinds of information
may distort individual behavior in an inefficient fashion. Fearing loss of employment and
social discrimination, people will either lie to their physicians or avoid seeking care that
might lead to the creation of sensitive health care or genetic information."); Patent Confi-
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Some commentators have used the fact that personal data has a
public-goods structure to argue that website/consumer interactions will
be inefficient.66 The mere fact that websites need not internalize the
costs they create for third-party Web users does not, by definition, mean
that the resulting website privacy norms are inefficient. The determina-
tive factor will be a Kaldor-Hicks test.67 This test makes a hypothetical
comparison of whether the websites' benefits from the activity could in
principle more than compensate Web users for their losses. As a practi-
cal matter, this determination is often exceedingly difficult to make with
any degree of certainty.
In the eyes of many privacy advocates, the calculation is not even
close, as the loss to individual privacy is thought to be so grievous and
fundamental as to outweigh any claim based merely on the prospect of
more efficient electronic commerce. The website industry sometimes
makes pronouncements to the effect that the benefits to industry, and
therefore to consumers indirectly, are great, while privacy-related
harms, although not insignificant, are nevertheless relatively small and
greatly exaggerated. The fact that the website industry makes this claim
cannot be taken as evidence of the industry's true estimation of the
likely result of a Kaldor-Hicks test, however, as industry speakers can
be expected to seek to maximize profit, not candor. Due to the lack of a
parallel profit motive, there may be less reason for cynicism with regard
to the distance between the expressed views and the actual views held
dentiality: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 105th Cong. (1998), available at 1998 WL 18089939 ("In the absence of such trust,
patients will be reticent to accurately and honestly disclose personal information, or they
may avoid seeking care altogether for fear of suffering negative consequences, such as em-
barrassment, stigma, and discrimination. Along the continuum, if doctors and other health
care providers are receiving incomplete, inaccurate information from patients, the data they
disclose for payment, research, public health reporting, outcomes analysis, and other pur-
poses, will carry the same vulnerabilities.").
66. See SWIRE & LITAN, supra note 26 ("Consider the incentives of a company that ac-
quires private information. The company gains the full benefit of using the information in its
own marketing efforts or in the fee it receives when it sells the information to third parties.
The company, however, does not suffer losses from the disclosure of private information.
Because customers often will not learn of the overdisclosure, they may not be able to disci-
pline the company effectively. In economic terms, the company internalizes the gains from
using the information but can externalize some of the losses and so has a systematic incen-
tive to overuse it. This market failure is made worse by the costs of bargaining for the
desired level of privacy. It can be daunting for an individual consumer to bargain with a
distant Internet merchant ... about the desired level of privacy. To be successful, bargaining
might take time, effort, and considerable expertise in privacy issues.").
67. See J.R. Hicks, The Valuation of the Social Income, 7 EcONOnICA 105, 110 (1940);
Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Inter-Personal Comparisons of
Utility, 49 EcoN. J. 549, 550 (1939).
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by public-interest privacy advocates. Accordingly, there is some reason
to suppose that a Kaldor-Hicks test may favor consumers over websites.
Some consumers, however, may be in a position on their own to
sanction misuses of their personal data." If it is the sort of site that one
might visit on a repeated basis, then users can sanction these sites by
withholding their visits and instead visit competing websites. In addi-
tion, disaffected users may sanction sites through negative gossip or
criticism. Consumers also may adopt self-help measures such as sup-
plying false information to the site.69 Under typical circumstances, this
behavior would be ruled out by a widely shared norm against deception
and lying. But there is a competing norm of turnabout-is-fair-play,
which may prove dispositive for numerous people who might otherwise
not be given to deception. 0
The problem, however, is that all of these self-help measures as-
sume that consumers have knowledge of the data extraction practices of
offending websites. It is precisely for this reason that websites have
generally sought at all costs to avoid explicit disclosure of their per-
sonal-data practices. Even when the consumer is aware that personal
data is being collected, there is still the potential for abuse because con-
sumers may be unaware of the uses to which their data is being put. For
example, a user might be passively aware that personal data, such as
credit card number or mailing address, are being collected, but have no
idea that this data is then being used by a website for purposes other
than processing payment or mailing a product. In particular, many sites
furtively sell data to third parties.7
68. Sanctions have the potential to promote efficient norms. The role that sanctions play
is to incentivize actors to adjust their norm conformity so as to take account of the sanction
in their overall calculation of the worthiness of conforming to the norm.
69. See George R. Milne, Privacy and Ethical Issues in Database/Interactive Marketing
and Public Policy: A Research Framework and Overview of the Special Issue, 19 J. PUB.
POL'Y & MKT. 1, 9 (2000) (summarizing studies: "When Web sites require consumers to
provide information to register, many consumers provide false information. Surveys report
that half the Internet users report false information about a quarter of the time (Graphic,
Visualization, & Usability Center 1998). Many surfers do not fill in reports because they are
concerned about their privacy and do not want to be spammed (Greenman 2000). As noted
by Petty (2000), unwanted contact is a primary concern of many consumers and a reason that
consumers balk at providing information. Sheehan and Hoy (2000) provide empirical evi-
dence that unwanted email contact is of high concern to online consumers."); Tan, supra
note 37, at 665 (citing a TRUSTe study stating "40% of Internet users have provided false
information at least once when registering at a website, and over 70% worry about making
on-line purchases."); Jerry Guidera, Online Shoppers Often Lie To Guard Privacy, Survey
Says, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 2000, available at 2000 WL-WSJE 2948132.
70. Some commentators have explicitly promoted the acceptability of supplying false
information as a self-help measure.
71. Studies indicate that consumers are particularly afraid of transfers of their personal
data to unknown third parties. See 1999 FTC REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 4.
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The website industry did not trumpet the fact that the website in-
dustry data-collection norms above characterized its behavior with
regard to the collection of personal data. The industry maintained these
norms because it was profit maximizing and legal for individual
websites to conform to them, not because the managers of the various
online firms, acting as a coherent group, wished to establish justified
norms of obligatory behavior for their industry. Thus, it served the
website industry's interests that these norms in general remained unar-
ticulated. This highlights the fact that norms, at their core, are patterns
of behavior as opposed to rules, statements, or other linguistic entities.72
The early website norms are fairly described as "permissive norms."
They create normative freedom for their conformers rather than obliga-
tions or constraints. 73 This is noteworthy as norms theorists often write
as if norms by definition express obligatory behavior. One illuminating
way to conceive of the project of privacy norm reformers, then, is that
their goal is to shift website norms from permissive norms to obligatory
norms.
B. Game-Theoretic Structure of the Original
Website Personal Data Norms
The purpose of informal game theory is to model the strategic
structure of social situations. The most famous and perhaps pervasive
strategic structure of interest to social scientists and policymakers has
been the structure variously known as the Prisoner's Dilemma, collec-
tive action problem, public good problem, or tragedy of the commons.
71
As the following discussion will demonstrate, the collective action
problem is applicable to the topic of online privacy.
72. A norm need not be expressed in linguistic terms in order to have content, whereas a
rule is by definition linguistic. A norm's content is defined in terms of its strategic structure.
A norm, then, is behavior of a certain sort, which may or may not have an attached linguistic
component. When characterizing a group's norms, it is necessary to keep in mind the differ-
ence between norms and rules, as it is important to be able to look at the actual practices of
groups, rather than merely going by what they express linguistically. Talk is cheap; it is
conforming behavior that creates benefits for conforming groups and externalities for third
parties. See Steven Hetcher, Norms, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHIcs 909, 909-12 (2d ed., Law-
rence C. Becker ed., 1992). Elsewhere, I adopt the term "norm statement" or "rule" for the
linguistic component of a full norm. Id.
73. See generally, SHELLEY KAGAN, THE LMTS OF MORALITY (1989).
74. Robert D. Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 587-88
(1998); Eric Posner, Symposium, Law, Economics & Norms: Law, Economics, and Ineffi-
cient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1697, 1699 (1996) ("A norm can be understood as a rule
that distinguishes desirable and undesirable behavior and gives a third party the authority to
punish a person who engages in the undesirable behavior.").
75. See generally HARDIN, supra note 18.
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Much less understood than the collective action problem is the coor-
dination game.76 While political scientists, economists, and philosophers
have been developing a deeper understanding of the coordination game
for a generation, legal theorists have only recently come to appreciate its
significance.7 The following discussion will demonstrate that coordina-
tion games have an important role to play in modeling the strategic
structure of some of the social situations that undergird the online privacy
debate.
This sub-part has three sections, each of which will explore a strategic
situation of concern to the privacy debate. Once these distinct strategic
structures are understood, it will be easier to proceed on a path toward
more respectful and efficient online personal-data norms. The first section
considers whether the original permissive norms of the website industry
can be accurately modeled as failed solutions to an iterated collective ac-
tion problem. This question arises because the FTC has made remarks
which suggest that it intuitively views the situation in these terms. I argue
in the second section, however, that this characterization is incorrect. In-
stead, the original, permissive norms of the website industry are best
modeled as a multi-party coordination game. Getting clear on this distinc-
tion matters tremendously because it affects how various norm
entrepreneurs should approach the task of bringing about more respectful
practices in the website industry. The third section demonstrates that there
is a significant collective action problem. It is website users, not the
websites, however, who face a collective action problem. Their collective
action problem arises with regard to organizing themselves to demand
more respectful privacy norms.
1. Purported Website Industry Prisoner's Dilemma
The FTC contends that it would be in the interest of the website in-
dustry to provide better privacy protection for consumers. The idea is that
by showing more respect for the data privacy of consumers, websites will
gain their trust and confidence. This in turn will lead to substantial growth
in electronic commerce as trusting consumers will be more inclined to use
the Internet to conduct their business. In its 1999 Report to Congress, the
FTC stated that, "The Commission's efforts have been based on the belief
that greater protection of personal privacy on the Web will not only bene-
fit consumers, but also benefit industry by increasing consumer
confidence and ultimately their participation in the online marketplace.""
76. See Hetcher, supra note 31, at 42.
77. Id. at 42 n. 160.
78. 1999 FTC REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 4, at 2-3; 1998 FTC REPORT TO CON-
GRESS, supra note 1, at 3-4.
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In his recent testimony before Congress, Marc Rotenberg of the Electronic
Information Privacy Center ("EPIC") made a similar assertion: "Users of
web-based services and operators of web-based services have a common
interest in promoting good privacy practices. Strong privacy standards
provide assurance that personal information will not be misused, and
should encourage the development of on-line commerce.""
As these remarks indicate, both the FTC and EPIC think that it would
be in the interest of the website industry to be more solicitous of the pri-
vacy concerns of consumers, in order to bring about greater user trust,
which in turn will lead to a more robust online marketplace. This shared
assumption by these leading online policy makers is crucial because of the
policy implications which the FTC appears to think flow from it. Specifi-
cally, if it is in the industry's interest to respect privacy, bringing about
more respectful practices will be a task of creating recognition across the
website industry of the importance of privacy for consumers and why it is
in the industry's interest to be solicitous of this concern of consumers. Not
surprisingly, then, the FTC has sought to promote more respectful indus-
try practices by means of educating the website industry. The FTC has
held a number of workshops and related events with the goal of raising
industry consciousness of the importance of data privacy."
The problem with the FTC's education program, however, is that it
implicitly treats the website industry as if it were a unitary actor capable
of behaving in a concerted fashion so as to promote its collective goals. In
its belief that its education program could achieve this result, the FTC
unwittingly falls prey to the so-called fallacy of composition." This is the
fallacy of thinking that because a group, considered as a whole, would
benefit from some particular political outcome, that therefore it is in the
interest of each of the particular members of that group to do its part to
79. Rotenberg, supra note 48.
80. See, e.g., FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, THE INFORMIATION MARKETPLACE: MERG-
ING AND EXCHANGING CONSUMER DATA, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/
infomktplace/index.html (March 13, 2001) (Public workshop notices posted on the FTC
homepage at www.ftc.gov).
81. HARDIN, supra note 18, at 2 ("Although it can make good sense to say that an indi-
vidual is rational, there is no obviously useful new sense in which we can typically say that a
group is rational. Yet, one of the more widely accepted doctrines of modem political sci-
ence-the group theory of politics-was based on a presumption from the fallacy of
composition: that a group of people with a common interest will take action to further that
interest. That doctrine has collapsed in the face of two major developments ... Mancur Ol-
son's logic of collective action and game theory's Prisoner's Dilemma. In the latter, there is
a dilemma precisely because what it makes sense for an individual to do is not what would
make sense for the group to do-if one could meaningfully speak of what the group should
do.").
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help bring about this political outcome. It is simply false to assume that a
typical website would have such an interest."
The benefit of a particular website's individual contribution to the
collective good, for all but the largest sites, will be marginal. Whether the
collective good comes about almost surely will not depend on the addi-
tional contribution of the particular site. Thus, from a narrowly rational,
economic perspective, the site is better off to free ride on the contributions
of the other sites. Either enough other sites cooperate and the collective
good is provided, or enough other sites do not cooperate, and the collec-
tive good is not provided. Either way, the behavior of the particular
website will have but a marginal impact. Thus, it might as well refrain
from incurring the expense of cooperating, that is, it might as well free
ride.
The problem is that all the other websites are similarly situated. Each
will have a dominating preference to free ride. The result is that all will
free ride and the collective good will not be produced.
The strategic structure of this situation may be represented as follows:
FIGURE I:
WEBSITE INDUSTRY COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM
Other Websites
Respect Privacy Disrespect Privacy
Respect Privacy 3,3 1,4
Website A
Disrespect Privacy 4,1 2,2
Figure 1 displays the strategic relationship between a particular firm,
call it Website A, and all other websites (as based on the FTC's assump-
tion described at the outset of this section). As indicated by the cardinal
payoffs in the southwest cell, A's first preference is that other firms
"Respect Privacy," so that it will be able to free ride on this set of prac-
82. Lighthouses are a classic example of a collective good as there is a collective action
problem with regard to the provision of the lighthouse. Each individual potential beneficiary
would benefit from the provision of a lighthouse. Nevertheless, there is a collective action
problem because once the lighthouse is provided, it is provided for all. In other words, the
individual cannot be excluded from benefitting from the good even though she did not con-
tribute toward its provision. Thus, each individual does best by defecting from providing her
share toward its provision. But since all potential beneficiaries are similarly situated, each
will free ride and hence the good will not be provided.
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tices and "Disrespect Privacy." For the time being, "Disrespect Privacy"
should just be taken to mean that the site will conform to the 'set of per-
sonal-data norms of the early website industry listed above, and "Respect
Privacy" should be taken to mean that the site will refrain from conform-
ing to these norms. Part Two below will provide greater content to the
notion of respecting consumer data privacy.
In the circumstance in which A free rides on the respectful behavior
of the other sites, A receives the highest payoff, 4." According to the
FTC, when other firms respect privacy, consumers will be less fearful of
the Internet and consequently more prone to participate in electronic
commerce. This will make it easier for website A to benefit from its own
disrespectful practices, as consumers will be less leery of providing per-
sonal data to the site, based on their generally positive experiences with
other sites.
The problem is that the same strategic situation pertains for the other
websites as well. Each website would like all the other sites to be respect-
ful so that it alone can take advantage of the more trusting consumers.
Because defection is the dominant strategy for all, however, the southeast
cell will be the result. Note that in the southeast cell, each site receives 2,
its second lowest payoff. If, however, the website industry were to be suc-
cessful in solving its collective action problem, the situation as
characterized in the northwest cell would obtain instead. In this situation,
each site would receive 3, its second highest payoff.
Note the distressing result that while all parties would do better by
cooperating and thus ending up in the northwest cell, nevertheless, due to
the fact that each is compelled by narrow self-interest to perform the non-
cooperative action, the mutually dispreferred group outcome as repre-
sented in the southeast cell is the actual result.' We see then that
individually maximizing behavior leads to a collectively suboptimal re-
sult; the classic collective action problem.
Uncovering this strategic structure inherent in the relationship among
websites has important policy implications. Recall that one of the FTC's
initiatives in order to promote online privacy was to educate the website
industry about the connection between treating consumers with respect
83. Each of the four pairs of numbers represents the payoffs to each party in each of the
four possible outcomes, the left-hand number is the payoff to the row-player and the right-
hand number is the payoff to the column player. Higher numbers represent more preferred
outcomes.
84. Based in part on its survey of over 1400 commercial websites, the FTC in 1998 con-
cluded that there was not yet effective self-regulation: "The Commission's examination of
industry guidelines and actual online practices reveals that effective industry self-regulation
with respect to online collection, use, and dissemination of personal information has not yet
taken hold." 1998 FTC REPORT TO CoNGRass, supra note I.
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and the expansion of electronic commerce. In light of the preceding dis-
cussion, however, it is clear that things are not so simple; educating the
industry participants, as to their collective interest will in no way address
the collective action problem faced by each of the particular members of
the industry with regard to the supply of this collective good. Education
may enhance the appreciation of each of the members as to the value of
the potential collective good available to the group, but it will not change
the incentives of individual members so as to bring the group any closer to
realizing the collective good.
It will be difficult for the website industry to solve this collective ac-
tion problem on its own. According to Ellickson's hypothesis, close-knit
communities may produce solutions to collective action problems, as they
provide opportunities for repeat play and multiplex relationships among
"neighbors."5 When there is repeated interaction, parties may have an
incentive to reach a mutually preferable manner of interaction because
they will take their long-term interests into account, and these will often
favor cooperation in current games in order to foster cooperation in future
games. In the present context, this would mean individual websites not
defecting on the cooperative behavior necessary to bring about a higher
level of consumer trust in online commerce.
It may not be possible to apply Ellickson's hypothesis in the present
context, however, as it is unclear whether the notions of "close-
knittedness" or "neighbor" have any reference in cyberspace. Ellickson
provides an extended discussion of land-use practices of the close-knit
ranching and farming community that inhabits Shasta County in Northern
California. This community's norms concern issues such as liability for
damage done by cattle and allocation of the costs of fencing, so as to
avoid damage from cattle. This discussion implicitly assumes that the
space in which interaction was taking place was physical space, not virtual
space. What allows the ranchers and farmers to be close-knit was their
physical proximity, as the subtitle of Ellickson's book-"How Neighbors
Settle Disputes"--indicates. 6
If the notion of close-knitedness is to have meaning online, then the
term must be cashed out in non-geographical terms. The Internet pro-
85. ELLICKSON, supra note 16, at 250. Ellickson defines "close-knit" groups as follows:
"A group is close-knit when informal power is broadly distributed among group members
and the information pertinent to informal control circulates easily among them." Id. at 177-
78. Ellickson's definition of close-knittedness implies "group members" having both
"continuing reciprocal power over one another and also a bank of shared information." Id. at
238. Ellickson notes that close-knittedness is inversely related to group size-the smaller the
group, the greater the degree of close-knittedness. See id. at 182. However, "[A] group does
not necessarily have to be small to be close-knit." Id.
86. ELLIcKSON, supra note 16.
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motes communication, par excellence, and thus is a boon to the formation
and maintenance of social relationships. There is no reason those online
relationships cannot involve repeat play and be overlapping, and there is
no reason they cannot involve sanctions. Thus, the core preconditions for
Ellickson's hypothesis may in principle be satisfied. More research is
needed on the extent to which mechanisms such as hyperlinking may pro-
vide the foundation for close-knit communities in cyberspace. Despite the
potential significance of this suggestion for our understanding of cyber-
space generally, the implication for website privacy norms is untoward, as
the relevant relationships at issue-those between websites and other
websites, websites and users, and users and other users-are typically not
close-knit. It is simply not the case that all the numerous sites on the In-
ternet have repeated and overlapping interactions with one another." The
unavoidable conclusion appears to be that the website industry will not be
able to solve its collective action problem on its own.
The collective action problem is a classical justification for govern-
mental intervention. 8 Websites could simply be required to adopt more
respectful practices.Y This would have the effect of forcing websites to
produce the cooperative outcome represented in the northwest cell in Fig-
ure 1. It is doubtful, however, whether the FTC has the authority to
demand that websites change their behavior." Even if the FTC had the
authority, if one takes their remarks at face value, this is not authority they
would care to exercise in this manner. As discussed earlier, the FTIC has
all along avowed an interest in promoting industry self-regulation to the
extent possible.9' If the agency is to remain faithful to this goal, it must
somehow indirectly encourage websites to solve their industry-wide col-
lective action problem. Collective action problems, however, are
87. Mark A. Lemley, Shrinkwraps in Cyberspace, 35 JtRImETRICS 311, 314 (1995) ("In
addition, the rapid growth in the number of network users has worked to transform cyber-
space in important respects. With its forty or fifty million users, the Internet is no longer
comprised of a limited set of close-knit communities in which private ordering can be based
on shared values and understanding."); see also, The Domain Name System: A Case Study of
the Significance of Norms to hIternet Governance, 112 HARv. L. REv. 1657, 1676-1680
(1999).
88. For the classic discussions, see WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, WELFARE EcONOMI~CS AND
THE THEORY OF THE STATE (1952); ANTHONY DoWNs, AN ECONosic THEORY OF DEMOc-
RAcy (1957).
89. For example, the E.U. Privacy Directive has a complex set of requirements to which
firms that use personal data of Europeans must adhere. See Privacy Directive, supra note 21.
90. Consumer hIternet Privacy: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci-
ence, and Transportation, 106th Cong. (2000) (Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director,
Electronic Privacy Information Center) ("The reliance of privacy guidelines on the FTC Act
prohibiting unfair and deceptive business practices has not provided an adequate basis for
the protection of privacy interest .... ).
91. Elsewhere, I question the FTC's sincerity in its stated desire to promote industry
self-regulation. See Hetcher, supra note 13.
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notoriously difficult to solve. Thus, the FTC would face an especially
daunting task in seeking to do so in an indirect manner.
2. Website Industry Coordination Norms
As noted at the outset of the previous section, the analysis of that sec-
tion was based on the assumption of the FTC that the website industry has
an overriding interest in bringing about more respectful privacy norms, if
only the constituent websites could coordinate their efforts to bring about
the cooperative result. It is more plausible to suppose, however, that the
benefit of increased electronic commerce is not worth the high cost that
providing respect for privacy might impose on websites.
The most significant cost for many sites of course will be the fact that
consumer personal data will no longer be theirs to use and manipulate at
will for free. In addition, for small sites, the very act of creating privacy
policies imposes a cost that may be significant.' For large sites, these de-
velopment costs are of marginal importance. But sites of successful or
well-funded companies face a much larger cost: the increased exposure to
litigation they face as a result of making explicit representations to site
visitors regarding the site's data-collection practices.93 Even if there is
some marginal increase in their online traffic due to heightened consumer
trust, it is more plausible to think that most sites would forego this benefit
in order to avoid exposure to legal liability. Thus, the problem the FTC
has in seeking to foster respect for privacy by self-regulatory means is not
best modeled as the problem of helping an industry group that is not
close-knit procure a collective good. Instead, as the following discussion
demonstrates, the'strategic structure faced by the website industry is actu-
ally that of a coordination norm.
A coordination norm is a practice in which each conformer receives a
"coordination benefit" for conforming to the norm. A coordination benefit
is the added benefit an actor receives for conformity, given the conformity
of other participants.94 To take a simple example, if the norm is to walk on
the right side of the sidewalk, such as it is in America, then a particular
92. Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that some sites avoid this cost by simply,
and illegally, cutting and pasting from the privacy policies of other sites that they find on the
Web.
93. For example, RealNetworks recently admitted that its RealJukebox assigned a per-
sonal ID number to users and uploaded information about their listening habits to its server,
contrary to its privacy policy. See Sara Robinson, CD Software Is Said to Monitor Users'
Listening Habits, N.Y. TIMms, Nov. 1, 1999, available at http://www.nytimes.com. The com-
pany was subsequently slapped with a $500 million class action lawsuit for violating
California's unfair business practices law. See RealNetworks is Target of Suit in California
Over Privacy Issue, N.Y. Tims, Nov. 9, 1999, available at http://%vww.nytimes.com.
94. See Hetcher, supra note 31, at 43-45 & nn. 161-68.
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conformer to this norm receives a benefit when others conform to the
norm as well, as she is less likely to be involved in a pedestrian collision.
A coordination norm may be "an equilibrium," a "coordination equi-
librium" or a "proper coordination equilibrium."95 An equilibrium is a
combination of choices in which each actor has done as well as the actor
can, given the choices of the other actors. No actor will regret its choice
given the choices of the others. A coordination equilibrium is a combina-
tion of choices such that no one would have been better off had any one
actor, either the actor or someone else, behaved differently. A proper co-
ordination equilibrium is a combination of choices such that no one would
have been as well off had any one actor behaved differently, either the
actor or someone else.96
Details aside, the crucial feature of coordination norms is that actors
conform to them because it is in their direct interest to do so. This con-
trasts with collective action problems in which each actor's direct
preference is not to conform but instead to defect, or free ride. With col-
lective action problems, conformity will be forthcoming only if the
participants are able to incentivize one another to conform due to the pos-
sibility of repeat play that results as a by-product of the overlapping social
relationships of close-knit communities. With coordination norms, by
contrast, actors want to conform, given the conformity of others. Hence,
efficient coordination norms may emerge in communities that are not
close-knit. 7
The present concern, then, is whether personal-data practices are best
modeled as coordination norms. The core feature of a coordination norm
is that an actor receives a coordination benefit from performing the con-
forming action, given the conformity of others. This condition is met with
regard to the permissive, data-collection practices of the early website
industry. As already noted, particular websites have a direct interest in not
95. See Hetcher, supra note 31, at 44, 74; DAVID LEwIs, CONVENTION (1969); EDNA
ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NoPsS (1977); see also Margaret Gilbert, Game
Theory and Convention, 46 SYNTHESE 41 (1981).
96. LEWIS, supra note 95. With a proper coordination equilibrium, other conformers re-
ceive a benefit when a particular actor conforms. It is this feature that causes David Lewis to
claim that "conventions" are best modeled as proper coordination equilibria. Conventions,
on Lewis' well-known account, are maintained in part by sanctions. Conformers sanction
one another for non-conformity because it is in the interest of others that each conform. The
sanctions are meant to ensure the conformity of others. The economics literature on
"network externalities" encompasses a similar but broader rational structure as not all net-
works with significant externalities are norms.
97. Coordination norms have similar structural features to "network effects." On net-
work effects generally, see, e.g., Mark A. Lemey & David McGowan, Legal Implications of
Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REv. 479 (1998) (arguing for limiting the assumption
that network effects produce suboptimal lock-in); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis,
Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 205 (1995).
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showing respect for consumers. By this means, they gain use of valuable
user data at less expense and effort and they avoid the worry of exposing
themselves to legal liability by making explicit representations to con-
sumers as to how their data will be used.
In addition, it is plausible to suppose that websites prefer that other
websites also fail to show respect for consumer privacy. First, websites
will be able to more successfully collect data when consumers are left in
the dark. Thus, all websites will be hurt to the extent that some particular
website takes it upon itself to be more forthcoming in telling consumers
about its data gathering activities. The greater the public awareness of
website data-gathering activities in general, the more likely it is for con-
sumers to be wary of the activities of any particular website, and the more
the site will be made to feel public pressure to alter its practices in the di-
rection of greater respect.
The second reason why websites prefer that other websites conform to
disrespectful privacy norms is that in privacy law, reasonable expectations
of privacy matter." An action in tort for invasion of privacy may be
brought in civil litigation by aggrieved parties.99 In such cases, a central
consideration is whether the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy. If most websites are collecting data at will, with no safeguards and
no notice, then the website-defendant will have a colorable defense based
on the claim that the plaintiff did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy.1°
For both of the above reasons, then, it is to be expected that industry
insiders will discretely promote disrespectful norms among their number
on whatever occasions present themselves, such as through trade associa-
tion meetings and the like, as doing so strengthens the norm and
consequently solidifies their safe harbor.'°' This means that these disre-
spectful website coordination norms will tend to be stable. Particular
websites will have no internal motivation to change their behavior, and
98. See, e.g., Dorothy Glancy, Symposium on Internet Privacy: At the Intersection of
Visible and Invisible Worlds: United States Privacy and the Internet, 16 SANTA CLARA COM-
PUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 357, 363-64 (2000) ("Assurances of privacy protection by e-
commerce vendors and Internet service providers demonstrate that the commercial side of
the Internet recognizes that respect for privacy is a significant expectation of Internet us-
ers.") (footnotes omitted).
99. See generally Fletcher v. Price Choppers Foods of Trumann, Inc., 220 F.3d 871
(2000); Cramer v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 209 F.3d 1122 (2000).
100. Andrew B. Buxbaum & Louis A. Curcio, When You Can't Sell to Your Customers,
Try Selling Your Customers (But Not Under the Bankruptcy Code), 8 Am. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 395, 411-12 (2000) (arguing that the appearance of privacy policies would create an
expectation of privacy).
101. See Hetcher, supra note 31.
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further, each site will have an incentive to motivate the other sites to con-
tinue their disrespectful behavior.
The original website data collection norms appear then to be a proper
coordination equilibria, as it is the case with each particular website that it
would not have been as well off had either it or some other website acted
differently by not conforming to the disrespectful privacy practices. This
situation is represented in the following payoff matrix.
FiGURE 2:
WEBSITE INDUSTRY COORDINATION GAME
Other Websites
Respect Privacy I Disrespect Privacy
Website A
Respect Privacy 2,2 1,3
Disrespect Privacy 3,1 4,4
The payoff matrix in Figure 2 displays the outcomes received by
websites depending on whether each of them, as well as the other
websites, participate in personal data collection practices that either
"Respect Privacy" of Web users, on the one hand, or "Disrespect Privacy"
of Web users, on the other hand. Note that the payoff to a typical website,
call it Website A, is affected by whether other websites respect privacy or
disrespect privacy. The dominating preference is to disrespect privacy.
Website A prefers to disrespect privacy regardless of what other sites are
doing. Thus, A's payoffs are higher in either of the southern cells as
compared to either of the northern cells. But A receives a coordination
benefit when other sites also disrespect privacy. Thus, the payoff for A is
higher in the southeast cell as compared to the southwest cell. A least
prefers the situation represented in the northeast cell in which it respects
privacy and other sites disrespect privacy. In this situation, there will be
no noticeable increase in electronic commerce and yet A has lost all the
benefits from the free receipt of user data.
Like A, other sites prefer to disrespect privacy, so their highest
payouts come in the eastern cells. They prefer, however, that A also
disrespect privacy, due to the coordination benefit of keeping consumers
in the dark. Thus, the other sites do better in the southeast as compared to
the northeast cell. If the other sites are respecting privacy, however,
then they will likely prefer that A do so as well, so that A is not at a
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competitive advantage. Thus, their payoff is higher in the northwest as
compared to the southwest cell.
Note that the outcome as represented in the southeast cell in which all
websites are disrespecting privacy is a stable equilibrium. No website has
any incentive to change its behavior, nor does any website have any in-
centive to get another website to change its behavior. Just the opposite,
each website has an incentive to encourage each other website not to
change its behavior. As should be obvious, this is not a happy outcome,
from the perspective of consumers or the FTC.
3. Web User Collective Action Problem
Note that the data-collection coordination norms of the website in-
dustry discussed in the previous section may function efficiently from a
point of view internal to the conformers themselves. The harm resulting
from these practices-the degradation of personal privacy-is success-
fully externalized onto the Web-surfing public.' °2 Because these data-
collection practices are bad for consumers as a group, there is the potential
for this group to secure an important collective good, the abatement of
these practices. As the current section demonstrates, however, there is a
severe practical problem in consumers securing this good. 3 Consumers
will face a collective action problem in seeking as a group to bring about
the collective good of more respectful website privacy practices. Thus,
when the analysis of this subsection is combined with that of the previous
two subsections, the surprising result is reached that while the website
industry does not face a collective action problem, the users of their
websites do.
As discussed earlier in the context of website practices, standard game
theory teaches that groups will stand their best chance of pursuing collec-
tive goods when their membership is close-knit such that members have
repeated interactions across a number of dimensions. This is more likely
102. The possibility of externalization of the costs of an industry custom is one reason
why the established "rule of custom" in tort law is that conformity to industry custom may
serve as evidence of due care, but is not dispositive. See Hetcher, supra note 31.
103. ULLMANN-MARGALIT, supra note 95 (recounting classic norm emergence and em-
phasizing that the first step is to identify underlying social situations in which an emergent
norm would promote efficiency).
104. Sociologists refer to such relationships as "multiplex." See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra
note 16, at 55. In the early days of the non-commercial Internet, online interactions were
typically between members of particular research communities. The members of those com-
munities often had "multiplex" relationships with one another. These researchers might see
each other at conferences; they might be former classmates, or share advisors or mentors; or
they might wish to seek future employment at one another's institutions. Accordingly, there
would often exist ample opportunities to sanction non-cooperative behavior, or reward coop-
erative behavior. Listservs such as The Well are of interest in this regard. The Well was pre-
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for smaller groups than larger groups, for groups that are close to one an-
other in geographical space, and for groups that share similar interests,
preferences, and histories. For example, the civil rights protestors who
fought for months and ultimately prevailed in integrating Nashville's
downtown restaurants in 1960 were African-American students of Fisk
University, who had together participated in extensive group training in
Gandhian methods of passive resistance.' 5
The Internet, however, makes collective action of this sort difficult. In
theory, privacy militants might electronically enter previously targeted
sites and all request downloads at the same time, such that the site's serv-
ers might be overwhelmed.' Clearly, this technique would require a good
deal of coordination and effort among a large number of people. Thus,
while possible in theory, such collective action is unlikely in practice."
Visitors to a website are the opposite of close-knit-they are globally in-
terspersed strangers. Thus, a solution to the Prisoner's Dilemma of the
sort outlined by Ellickson is unlikely, due to the larger numbers of web
users who lack overlapping or close-knit relationships. Accordingly, we
can predict that extant website practices will represent a failure by con-
sumers to solve collective action problems regarding the abatement of the
degradation of their data privacy.
Moreover, the mere existence of a collective action problem does not
imply that a norm, or set of norms, has been identified to deliver the po-
tential collective good. A particular consumer who wanted to do her part
to bring about the collective good of greater respect for consumers would
Web and non-commercial. In addition, many of its members were part of a relatively close-
knit community, the Bay Area Internet cognoscenti. The Well nevertheless allowed members
to interact anonymously if they wished. Predictably, serious problems arose with the com-
munity. See ESTHER DYSON, RELEASE 2.0: A DESIGN FOR LIVING IN THE DIGITAL AGE
(1998).
105. See DAVID FARBER, THE AGE OF GREAT DREAMS: AMERICA IN THE 1960s, 76
(1994).
In Nashville, which became the focal point for the sit-in movement, the means by
which a protester should politely refuse to accept the legal bounds set by civil so-
ciety were carefully codified. James Lawson, a longtime student of Gandhian non-
violence, explained: 'Do show yourself friendly on the counter at all times. Do sit
straight and always face the counter. Don't strike back or curse if attacked.' With
discipline, the protesters were turning American society on its head.
Id.
106. Tom Kirchofer, Microsoft Networks Tap Akamai, BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 30, 2001,
at 29 (noting that "Denial of Service" attacks overwhelm a company's computer with infor-
mation and prevent legitimate traffic from getting through); see also Greg Miller, Microsoft
Hit by New Wave of Outages; Internet: Hackers Cripple Company's Most Popular Websites;
FBI is Asked to Probe "Denial of Service" Attacks, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 26, 2001, at C3.
107. In addition, websites may have more ready access to technological means to re-
move protesters. See LESSIG, supra note 3, at 66-70 (noting that no protesters allowed in
AOL space through restrictive coding).
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not know where to start. There are no previously identified norms of be-
havior which, if conformed to by consumers, would help force websites
into more respectful behavior. Because there is no cooperative norm under
way, there is no form of cooperative behavior to internalize,' no issue of
loss of esteem for failing to be cooperative,' and no concern to signal to
others that one is a cooperative online activist." ° It seems unlikely, then,
that better website practices will emerge as a result of consumer collective
action along the lines of any of the other leading models for solving col-
lective action problems.
It will be useful to summarize the discussion of this first Part in order
to see how this last finding regarding the dismal prospects for consumer
collective action fits in with the earlier findings. The key fact on which the
whole analysis thus far is predicated, is that the original data-collection
norms adopted by the website industry demonstrated a good deal of disre-
spect for consumer privacy. Essentially, the vast majority of websites did
whatever they wanted with regard to the use of personal information on
consumers, with complete disregard for the impact of these activities on
the privacy interests of these consumers. Despite growing complaints
about this significant threat to individual privacy, the government was
reticent to directly regulate this activity, apparently in response to the
widespread norm that, as much as possible, the Internet should be left free
to self-regulate.
Internet self-regulation, at least in the context of website practices
with regard to the personal data of consumers, has been widely regarded
as a failure."' In the above discussion, informal game theory was utilized
in order to better understand why self-regulation has failed to produce a
set of online practices that better respected consumer privacy. Generally
speaking, self-regulation failed due to the strategic structure of the under-
lying social situations that obtained regarding the relationships between
consumers and websites, on the one hand, and websites with one another
on the other hand. Specifically, websites are in a coordination game with
one another, not an iterated collective action problem. Thus, efforts to
108. Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Ap-
proach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643, 1690-94 (1996).
109. Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REv. 338, 342 (1997) ("theory of origin and growth of norms" in which "the initial
force behind norm creation is the desire individuals have for respect or prestige, that is, for
the relative esteem of others.").
110. ERic A. POSNER, LAw AND SocIAL Noaais (2000); Eric A Posner, Symbols, Sig-
nals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 765, 780 (1998).
111. See Marc Rotenberg, supra note 90; see also Brendan Maher, Self-Regulation,
TARGET MARKETING, Dec. 1, 2000, available at 2000 WL 10932469 (arguing that consum-
ers and businesses have little confidence in self-regulation and citing to a survey claiming
24% of adults polled felt the federal government should set privacy rules).
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educate websites on the importance of privacy to consumers, and on the
connection between allaying consumer privacy fears and the promotion of
consumer confidence, will not work to change website behavior in the
manner desired by the FTC. Nor will consumers be able to band together
to demand more respectful privacy practices on the part of websites due to
the large-scale collective action problem they face.
A number of commentators concluded that the failure of self-
regulation to overcome these hurdles mandated that the government step
in and take a direct role in requiring more respectful informational prac-
tices on the part of websites. In the discussion in Part II below, however, it
will be shown that direct government regulation of website practices has
in fact not been required in order to bring about more respectful privacy
practices. While the FTC has played an important role, its role has been
that of a norm entrepreneur rather than a norm imperialist.
I1. WEBSITE NORM ENTREPRENEURS PROMOTE
PRIVACY-RESPECTINGWEBSITE
INDUSTRY CUSTOMS
Despite the serious obstacles explored above, significant progress has
been made in moving toward industry norms that are more respectful of
consumer privacy. In less than a decade, norms of respect for consumer
privacy have emerged on the Internet. Evidence of this norm is every-
where. For example, AOL/Time-Wamer's advertisements now typically
contain assurances that the company ensures consumer privacy. A dra-
matic shift such as this, occurring over a relatively short period of time, is
fairly characterized as a "norm cascade."' 12 This cascade in turn was pre-
cipitated by a "norm shock," introduced by the FTC."3 The grundnorm of
respect is still aspirational to a large extent, in that many websites are not
yet complying, or are under-complying."4 Nevertheless, many websites
are indeed taking consumer privacy more seriously, and those that are
tend to be the largest and busiest sites."5 Furthermore, those sites not cur-
rently taking privacy seriously are increasingly feeling the heat to do so.
The situation has gone from one of a solid, albeit unarticulated, norm
of permissive non-respect for data privacy in the early to middle 1990s, to
one in which there are two competing sets of norms, the old, non-
respectful norms of permissiveness with regard to personal data, and the
112. See Sunstein, supra note 29.
113. See Hetcher, supra note 13.
114. See 2000 FTC REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 14.
115. Id.
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new norms which are more respectful of consumer privacy concerns. In
the public mindset, there are now good websites and bad websites, when it
comes to the issue of consumer privacy. In effect, a market in websites is
emerging, such that consumers are increasingly in a position to choose
among websites based on the extent to which these sites participate in per-
sonal data practices that suit the particular consumer's individual
preferences. This represents a shift toward a situation in which market-
place-oriented norms of fair exchange are increasingly coming to
dominate the policy framework governing online privacy.
Based on the manner in which many online privacy advocates talk,
one might initially think that the only data-collection practices attractive
to consumers were those that collected no data whatsoever. In fact, how-
ever, this is not what consumers expect, or indeed want. The vast majority
of websites are free. The business models of many of these sites have
been based mainly on deriving advertising revenue from banner ads. A
secondary source of revenue comes from data collection and processing.
In addition, personal data is used increasingly as a means to more person-
alized marketing. Personal information about individuals is used to market
products and services suited to their specific preference profiles. Many
consumers willingly will trade away personal data as long as they receive
valuable consideration in return.' 6 Indeed, the efforts of the norm entre-
preneurs that will be discussed below are not best understood as seeking
to minimize data collection and use, per se, but rather to change the nature
of the relationship between websites and consumers from a non-
consensual to a consensual relationship. Under this normative framework,
personal data is increasingly becoming a commodity that data subjects can
bargain away for valuable consideration.
117
There have been two main stages in the development of these in-
creasingly consensual and respectful norms. The first stage involved the
articulation of aspirational norms. This process was initiated by the pub-
lic-interest privacy advocacy community. Much of the early advocacy
work of defining appropriate privacy norms was performed in the United
States. More recently, however, the European Union has exerted pressures
116. The FTC recommends that any legislation passed be in broad and technologically
neutral terms so industry and consumers can continue self-regulatory initiatives. See Privacy
Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic Marketplace: Hearing Before the Sen-
ate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 106th Cong. (2000) (Prepared
Statement of the FTC), available at http:lwww.ftc.govlasl2000/05/testimonyprivacy.htm.
This enables consumers to "trade away" their personal data for prizes or discounts if they so
choose. See Jennifer Jones, Cashing in on Privacy, NETWORK WORLD FUSION, Sept. 12,
2000 (noting that consumers are willing to trade personal data if the incentives are high
enough).
117. See Radin, supra note 44.
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that are increasingly affecting the domestic policy agenda regarding data
privacy. The website industry has become involved, apparently out of a
fear that if it did not, the public-interest advocacy community would com-
pletely dominate the terms of the debate.
In the second stage, the FTC began introducing incentives to get the
website industry to take these aspirational norms more seriously. The
norms promoted by the FTC are seen best as a compromise between the
expansive set of aspirational norms promoted by the privacy advocacy
community, and the more limited norms proposed by the website industry.
Strange as it sounds, the FTC has sought to promote consumer data
privacy by seeking to change the nature of the strategic situation faced by
the website industry from a coordination game into a large-scale,
collective action problem. The FTC has sought to create a situation in
which it would be in the industry's interest to better respect consumer
privacy as a means to securing a collective good made possible by the
FTC. This collective good is the avoidance of a statute that would force
the industry to provide a high level of privacy protection. The FTC
essentially threatened the website industry that either the industry perform
substantially better, industry-wide, in respecting privacy, or else the
agency would press for a statute. This threat created a situation in which
the larger websites were incentivized to conform to more respectful
privacy norms, and to incentivize smaller sites to do so as well, by
threatening to withdraw their substantial advertising dollars from these
smaller sites if they did not show more respect for consumer privacy."
8
Stage One: The Articulation of Aspirational Norms
The public-interest, privacy advocacy community has played a vener-
able role in articulating aspirational website privacy norms. The
community first arose in the 1960s in response to the United States gov-
ernment's initial efforts to use supercomputers to construct
comprehensive databases of personal data on its citizens. When websites
first emerged in the early 1990s and began to take part in questionable
data-collection practices, this community had a normative framework al-
ready available, which could then be applied to the new set of facts.
Especially influential early on were the norms developed by the Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD"), which
endorsed eight "privacy guidelines," as set out in the following list:
118. See infra text accompanying notes 109-10.
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Marc Rotenberg, director of EPIC, has stated that OECD's eight prin-
ciples for data protection are still the "benchmark for assessing privacy
policy and legislation.' "'o Recently, EPIC has translated the OECD's pri-
vacy norms to the context of websites. The following five website-specific
privacy norms are the result.
EPIC Website Privacy Norms
1. Web sites should make available a privacy policy that is easy
to find. Ideally the policy should be accessible from the
homepage by looking for the word "privacy."
2. Privacy policies should state clearly how and when personal
information is collected.
3. Web sites should make it possible for individuals to get ac-
cess to their own data.
4. Cookies transactions should be transparent.
5. Web sites should continue to support anonymous access for
Internet users.121
These aspirational website privacy norms are fairly seen as represen-
tative of the sorts of protection currently being demanded by public-
interest privacy advocates generally. The five items on the list are each
"thick" norms that concretely describe specific practices that will increase
119. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Guidelines on the
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, available at
http://www.oecd.org/dsti/sti/it/secur/ (Sept. 23, 1980).
120. Rotenberg, supra note 48.
121. Id.
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consumer privacy vis-h-vis websites.'2 In fact, these proposed norms are
so ambitious that they created fear in the website industry, which views
the norms as unworkable and overly expensive to implement.' 2 The in-
dustry's response has been to promote less demanding norms.
The website industry acknowledges that consumers have legitimate
privacy interests in their personal data." This is a striking admission. One
might well have expected the industry to take the more aggressive
position that since personal data is in the public domain, they are as
entitled to its use as the data subjects. Instead, the typical posture of
industry is to acknowledge, in effect, that data subjects have some special
entitlement to their personal data, despite a dearth of protection within the
letter of the law.
The website industry's bone of contention with public-interest, pri-
vacy advocates is over the proper conception of privacy, how much
privacy is appropriate, and which thick behavioral practices should in-
stantiate the norm of respect for privacy. In other words, the disagreement
is not over respect for privacy, per se, but instead over which second-order
norms and which thick behavioral norms should be instantiated to pro-
mote this respect.
The website industry generally has promoted a fairly minimalist set of
practices. In principle, the industry supports giving consumers "notice"
and "consent" to the collection and use of personal data. The crucial de-
bate, however, is over how the general requirements of notice and consent
are to be concretely implemented. The most heated debate has focused on
whether fair notice and consent require an "opt-in" regime or instead
whether an "opt-out" regime is satisfactory. With opt-out, personal data
will automatically be collected unless a consumer specifically takes some
action to indicate that she does not wish to have her data collected, while
with opt-in, the default is that personal data will not be collected unless
the consumer takes a specific action to explicitly agree to the collection of
data.'" EPIC and other public interest advocates support an "opt-in" re-
gime while the website industry supports an "opt-out" regime.
122. The notion of "thick" moral features derives from the philosophical literature on
moral realism. See, e.g., JOHN McDOWELL, MORAL REALisM (1991).
123. Todd R. Weiss, Bush Faces His First Privacy Challenge Proposals from Industry,
Advocates Differ, COMPUTERWORLD, Jan. 22, 2001.
124. Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1691 (arguing that the concept of notice being
equivalent to privacy protection seems to be capturing much of the policy debate).
125. An opt-in policy has been promoted by industry groups such as the Direct Mar-
keting Association ("DMA") and the Online Privacy Alliance. Both groups have been
leading proponents of industry self-regulation. The Online Privacy Alliance is a coalition of
more than eighty companies and trade associations that formed in early 1998 to encourage
self-regulation of data privacy. See 1999 FrC REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 4, at 7.
2000-20011
134 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 7:97
This section briefly has considered the competing aspirational norms
promoted by public-interest electronic privacy advocates, such as EPIC on
the one hand, and the website industry, on the other hand. While these
organizations articulated aspirational norms, they were not well positioned
to bring them into reality. Private industry advocates generally lacked the
desire, while public-interest advocates generally lacked the power. The
website industry had adopted a reactive posture, in essence, contending
that online privacy is not a significant problem worth addressing, but if it
is to be addressed, then the industry's more minimal norms are preferable.
The pubic-interest advocates, on the other hand, have done everything in
their power to promote expansive privacy norms. While this group may
have lacked the direct power to change website norms, nevertheless it has
dramatically raised the level of public awareness regarding the threat to
consumer privacy posed by commercial online activities. This impact ap-
pears to have been significant, engendering an outcry among the public
and media. 126 This outcry, in turn, is plausibly being reflected in the in-
crease in attention shown to online privacy issues in Congress and the
previous Administration.27
A. Stage Two: The FTC's Attempt to Create an
Industry-Wide Collective Action Problem
In 1995, the FTC was asked by Congress to investigate the privacy
risks associated with computer databases. The agency has been increas-
ingly involved with the issue of online privacy ever since. The FTC acts
pursuant to its authority under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
which mandates that the agency address "unfair" and "deceptive" trade
practices.' Generally speaking, then, the FTC's hook into the privacy
126. Brian Krebs, IT Industry Council Signals Privacy-Law Advocacy, NEWSBYTES,
Feb. 2, 2001 (reporting that due to public outcry lawmakers are suggesting federal electronic
privacy protections); see also Rosalind C. Tritt, Privacy: A Threat to Free Speech?, PRES-
STME, Jan. 2001, at 27; PrivacyRight, Inc. Forms Strategic Equity Partnership with Venture
Factory, PR NEWSIRE, June 6,2000.
127. In a series of hearings beginning in October and November of 1995, the FTC has
examined consumer protection issues, including privacy concerns. See Internet Privacy:
Hearing Before House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998), available at http:fl
www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9803/privacy.htm.
128. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1994). The FTC prosecutes "[u]nfair methods of competition
... and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce" under § 5 of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act ("FTCA"). See id. Section 13(b) authorizes the prosecution of
actions to enforce § 5. See id. § 57(b). Section 18 permits the FTC to create rules to prohibit
deceptive or unfair practice prevalent in certain industries. See id. § 57(a).
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debate comes by means of casting website data-gathering practices as po-
tentially unfair and deceptive. 29
Significantly, the FTC claims it is moved to action because consum-
ers strongly feel entitled to data privacy.30 In other words, it is the
existence of a strongly held community norm of entitlement to one's own
data that pulls the initial causal levers leading the FTC toward greater
consumer online privacy protection. 3' The FTC does not take note of the
fact that in other contexts, a mere desire for control of property in the
public domain does not create entitlement to control this property. As the
previous discussion indicated, while the website industry disputes the
level of privacy protection necessary, it does not contest the fundamental
proposition that data subjects have some sort of entitlement to, or property
claims in, their personal data. Thus, the FTC has not met with resistance
from the website industry on the issue of data subject entitlement to per-
sonal data, per se.
The FTC has promoted more respectful website privacy norms by at-
tempting to affect the behavior both of consumers and of the website
industry. As discussed in Part I, the agency early on made efforts to edu-
cate the public about industry uses of their personal data, maintained a
website that provided information, as well as tools, to assist consumers
who wished to be proactive in seeking their own privacy, and held work-
shops to get industry representatives and privacy advocates together.
32
129. Note that the FrC's framework for regulating unfair practices does not require
ownership of personal data. The fact that data subjects may have de facto control over their
data is enough to generate an instance of an unfair or deceptive trade practice. This means
that the agency has jurisdiction over website activities without a change in the intellectual
property status of personal data.
130. The FTC cites consumer preference studies to bolster its claims regarding the
public's desire to maintain privacy online. Fair Information Partners in the Electronic Mar-
ketplace: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
106th Cong. (2000) (prepared statement of the FrC noting that 92% of consumers are con-
cerned about misuse of their personal information and 62% are "very concerned"), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/osl2000/os/testimonyprivacy.htm.
131. § 809: "Online Privacy Protection Act of 1999": § 2606 "Consumer Privacy
Protection Act," § 2928 "Consumer Internet Privacy Enhancement Act": Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 106th Cong. (2000) (FDCH tes-
timony arguing Americans believe they own their personal data).
132. At the 2000 Computers, Freedom & Privacy conference, a Novell representative
who is in charge of worldwide privacy compliance for Novell explained that engineers by
training build databases that are capable of gathering as much information as possible,
whether this be personal data or data of some other sort, even if the narrow purposes for
which the databases are created do not require such comprehensiveness. As she explains it,
part of her job has been simply to educate the company's large number of engineers world-
wide that more data, per se, is not better. Thus, while education alone cannot change the
basic fact that most websites may have a dominant preference to disrespect consumer pri-
vacy concerns, nevertheless, education may be able to irradicate unnecessary data collection.
Commissioned Research Confirms Privacy is a Key Issue Influencing Consumer Acceptance
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The FTC appeared, however, to have reached the conclusion that
these educational efforts by themselves, were not enough. Rather, they
must be coupled with incentives to change the payoff structure of current
norms, such that cooperation would come to promote the self-interest of
websites. The FrC integrated its education and incentive approaches in
the following manner. First, it began educating the website industry about
the agency's expectations regarding an adequate degree of respect for pri-
vacy in more concrete terms, by proffering the so-called "fair information
practice principles" ("FIPPs"). Second, the FTC issued threats to change
the incentive structure faced by the website industry. The fair practice
principles are discussed in the following section. The FTC's use of threats
to incentivize websites to adopt these norms will be examined in the sec-
tion following that.133
1. The Issuance of Fair Information Practice Principles
The following list sets out the fair information practice principles
promoted by the FTC.
The FTC's Fair Information Practice Principles
1. The Notice/Awareness principle
2. The Choice/Consent principle
3. The Access/Participation principle
4. The Integrity/Security principle
5. The Enforcement/Redress principle
These five principles are best understood as second-order norms, as
they are susceptible to a number of colorable concrete interpretations. The
of Internet Billing; Gallup Poll Uncovers Opportunities to Build Consumer Confidence in
2001 by Implementing Best Practices for Online Privacy, PR NEWSWIRE, Jan. 16,2001.
133. The FrC has become the leading website privacy norm entrepreneur. While di-
verse instances of norm entrepreneurs are found in the legal literature, there are only a few
instances of governmental entities discussed as norm entrepreneurs. In its everyday use, the
word "entrepreneur" applies to someone in business, usually a principal in the business.
Government agencies, however, are not in business. In what sense, then, may they function
as entrepreneurs? By the lights of economic analysis, all actors are entrepreneurs in the sense
that all actors seek to maximize something, whether it be a private firm seeking to maximize
profit or a public-interest privacy advocate seeking to maximize the aggregate level of indi-
vidual privacy throughout society. The core assumption is that actors are rational and that
rationality demands that the actor act so as to maximize that which the actor values, its utility
function. In the context of live persons, economics generally conceives of actors seeking to
maximize their self-interest, welfare or happiness. Firms are thought to aim at maximizing
profit. Governmental agencies are often conceived by economists as seeking to maximize
size and power of the agency. See Hetcher, supra note 13.
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FTC contends that these principles would be promoted best by their in-
corporation into website "privacy policies." Consider first the basic
characterizations of these principles and then their relationship to privacy
policies.
The FTC considers the Notice/Awareness principle to be the most
fundamental. According to this principle, consumers must be given notice
of a company's information practices before personal information is col-
lected from them. The scope and content of the notice may properly vary
with a company's substantive information practices, but the notice itself is
essential, as the other core principles have meaning only if a consumer has
notice of an entity's information practices and his or her respective
rights.' T '
The Choice/Consent principle requires that consumers be given op-
tions with respect to whether and how personal information collected
from them may be ued. The Access/Participation principle requires that
consumers be given reasonable access to information collected about
them and the ability to contest that data's accuracy and completeness. The
Integrity/Security principle requires that companies take reasonable steps
to assure that information collected from consumers is accurate and secure
from unauthorized use. Finally, the effectiveness of the foregoing privacy
protections is dependent upon implementation of the Enforce-
ment/Redress principle, which requires that governmental and/or self-
regulatory mechanisms impose sanctions for noncompliance with fair in-
formation practices."'5
The FTC calls these five principles "fair information practice" princi-
ples. The FTC says nothing of a substantial nature, however, to explain
how each of the principles promotes fairness.'36 Nor is it at all intuitively
134. 1999 FTC REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 4, at 3; Robert MacMillan, Congress
to Air Public Concerns Over Privacy, NE\VSBYTES, Sept. 5, 2000 (arguing that privacy advo-
cates are split with some advocating very strong privacy protections).
135. The European Union ("EU") has recognized that self-regulation may in certain
circumstances constitute "adequate" privacy protection for purposes of the EU Directive's
ban on data transfer to countries lacking "adequate" safeguards. See Privacy Directive, supra
note 21, art. 25. The EU has noted, however, that non-legal rules such as industry association
guidelines are relevant to the "adequacy" determination only to the extent they are complied
with and that compliance levels, in turn, are directly related to the availability of sanctions
and/or external verification of compliance. See European Commission, Directorate General
XV, Judging Industry Self-Regulation: When Does it Make a Meaningful Contribution to
the Level of Data Protection in a Third Country? (1998), available at http:/l
www.europa.eu.int/comm/dgl5/en/media/dataprot/wp7.htm.
136. Elsewhere, I argue that there is a compelling public choice explanation for the
FTC's shoehorning of the panoply of activities into single normative notion of fairness,
which is that doing so allows the FTC to exert jurisdiction over the growing area of public
concern. See Hetcher, supra note 13. If the agency is thought of as a business, it can be seen
as having executed a heads-up strategic play to move onto the Internet. And unlike many
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clear what fairness requires when it comes to the collection and use of
personal data by websites. The industry has complained, for example, that
it is held to a higher standard than off-line firms. Despite this ambiguity,
the agency has provided little guidance as to the standards of fairness it
intends to apply in determining which websites might fall below an ac-
ceptable level of fairness.
It appears, however, that the FTC has been reluctant to bring en-
forcement actions against websites for simple non-consensual data
gathering or use.'37 This is likely due to the fact that the activities of
websites are, facially at least, legal. It is not illegal to collect data from
consumers and use this data in a variety of ways, such as by selling it,
while never informing the data subject, much less seeking explicit con-
sent. Thus, the situation is one in which the data-collection activities of
websites are legal, on the one hand, but unfair by the lights of the fairness
norms articulated by the FTC, on the other hand. Unwilling or unable to
bring enforcement actions based on current website practices, the FTC
businesses currently facing this task, the FTC did not need to cannibalize from its traditional
base, as it continues to regulate in the non-virtual world as well.
137. Lawsuits filed so far have involved more than simple unconsented data collection
and use. See Diane Anderson & Keith Perine, Privacy Issue Makes DoubleClick a Target,
INDUSTRY STANDARD (Feb. 3, 2000), available at http://vww.thestandard.com/article/
display/0,1151,9480,00.html; Jeri Clausing, Privacy Adovcates Fault New DoubleClick
Service, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 15, 2000, at C2; Will Rodger, Activists Charge DoubleClick Dou-
ble Cross, USAToday.com (Feb. 21, 2000), available at http:// www.usatoday.com/
life/cyber/tech/cth2l 1.htm; Privacy on the Internet, N.Y. T"Ams, Feb. 22, 2000, at A26; see
also Complaint filed In the Matter of DoubleClick, Inc. (F.T.C. Feb. 10, 2000) (alleging
violations of the FrC Act prohibiting unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce in its alleged practice of using cookies to create profiles of Internet users in con-
tradiction of its stated privacy policy), available at http:l/www.epic.org/privacy/intemetl
ftc/DCLK_complaint.pdf; Complaint filed in Donaldson v. DoubleClick, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
1, 2000) (No. 00-Civ.-0696) (seeking class action status while alleging violations of federal
Electronic Communications Privacy Act and other federal statutes, deceptive advertising
under New York law, and common law unjust enrichment and invasion or privacy, for Dou-
bleClicks alleged practice of using cookies to create profiles of Internet users in
contradiction of its stated privacy policy); Complaint filed in Healey v. DoubleClick, Inc.
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2000) (No. 00-CIV.-00641) (seeking class action status while alleging
violations of federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act and other federal statutes, de-
ceptive advertising under New York law, and common law unjust enrichment and invasion
of privacy, for DoubleClick's alleged practice of surreptitiously using cookies to create pro-
files of Internet users); Complaint filed in Judnick v. DoubleClick, Inc. (Main Cty. Sup. Ct.
Jan. 27, 2000) (No. CV-421) (seeking private attorney general status while alleging state law
claims of unfair business practices and false and misleading advertising by DoubleClick for
its alleged practice of using cookies to create profiles of Internet users in contradiction of its
stated privacy policy), available at http://www.perkinscoie.comlresource/ecomml
netcase/complaintl.pdf; Pamela Parker, DoubleClick's Legal Troubles Deepen, Internet
News (Feb. 4, 2000), available at http:lww.internetnevs.comlbus-news/article/
0,1087,3.299771,00.html.articles; Sandeep Junnarkar, DoubleClick Accused of Unlawfiul
Consumer Data Use, CNET News.corn (Jan. 28, 2000), available at http://
www.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-1534533.html.
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devised a plan to issue threats in order to cause websites to be more so-
licitous of their users' privacy, despite the fact that the websites' behavior
was not illegal.
2. Creating a New Game Through Threats
In 1998, the FTC threatened the website industry that it would rec-
ommend that Congress enact privacy legislation if more respectful
industry customs and usages were not forthcoming through industry self-
regulation. The threat was highly credible and particularly salient, due to
the Commission's recent success in influencing legislation to protect chil-
dren's online privacy.' This threat was a shock to the normative
equilibrium of the website industry, causing many firms to alter their be-
havior. Generally, the impact of the FFC's threat correlated with website
size and structure, the larger and more multi-faceted a website's activities,
the more likely it was that the website had reason to react to the FTC's
threat by seeking to provide more respectful privacy practices. In fact,
some large sites apparently felt so threatened that they took it upon them-
selves to incentivize smaller sites into compliance with more respectful
norms.
In modeling the shift in norms that occurred, there are three relevant
time periods to consider: 1) the time prior to FT7C's threat, 2) the time af-
ter the FTC's threat, and 3) the time after the large websites began
threatening the small websites. The strategic structure faced by the
website industry in each of these time periods will be modeled with three
informal, game-theoretic payoff matrices.
Attention will be focused on the FFC's main policy initiative during
this period, which was to encourage websites to adopt "privacy policies,"
or "privacy statements." As already mentioned, the FTC apparently
viewed privacy policies as the most effective means to implement fair
information practice principles. According to the FTC, all the fair
138. In 1998, after finding self-regulation of children's online privacy to be inadequate,
the FrC recommended to Congress that it enact legislation, which Congress quickly did,
enacting the Children's Online Protection Act. On October 21, 1998, the President signed
into law the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 ("COPPA"). Title XIII, Om-
nibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, PUB. L. 105-
277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-287 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506) (October 21, 1998),
reprinted at 144 CONG. Rac. H1l,240-42 (Oct. 19, 1998). The stated goals of the Act are:
(1) to enhance the parental involvement in a child's online activities in order to protect the
privacy of children in the online environment; (2) to help protect the safety of online fora for
children such as chat rooms, home pages, and pen-pal services in which children may make
public postings of identifying information; (3) to maintain the security of children's personal
information collected online; and (4) to limit the collection of personal information from
children without parental consent. 144 CONG. REc. S12,741 (1998) (Statement of Sen.
Bryan).
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information practice principles can be promoted in a privacy policy."9 A
privacy policy that accurately and completely stated the site's personal
data practices would be an instantiation of the key principle of
notice/awareness. Once the consumer has notice of the website's
practices, she can consent to the data exchange or exit the site. In addition,
stipulations concerning access/participation to the user's personal data on
file with the site can be set out in the privacy policy, as can stipulations
concerning integrity/security and enforcement/redress.
Payoff matrix Three below represents the strategic situation faced by
a particular representative website, A, vis-a-vis the rest of the website in-
dustry, with regard to two alternative website industry practices: one in
which privacy policies are the industry custom and practice, and the other
in which they are not. This situation, then, is a particular instantiation of
the general coordination game faced by the website industry vis-a-vis re-
spect for privacy, tout court, as represented in Figure 2 above.
FIGURE 3:
WEBSITE INDUSTRY BEFORE THREAT
Website Industry
Privacy Policy No Privacy Policy
Privacy Policy 2,2 1,3
Firm A
No Privacy Policy 3,1 4,4
Note that in the southeast cell, which represents the situation in which
no site provides a privacy policy, A receives 4, her highest payoff. Failing
to provide a privacy policy gives A greater flexibility. The site can ex-
periment with various business plans that use personal data in different
ways, without having to worry that doing so violates previous representa-
tions made in the site's privacy policy. If the site seeks to take advantage
of new opportunities that make use of new forms of personal data that
happen to be available to it as a by-product of its interaction with users,
139. Could Try Harder: Protecting Privacy on the Internet, THE ECONOIST, May 27,
2000 (noting that only 20 percent of websites collecting personal information implement all
of the fair information practice principles-leaving the FrC to argue that if implemented the
principles would be effective. The FTC recommends Congress establish some basic privacy
rules and give the FTC the power to implement these rules); see also Nancy Weil, FTC Says
Internet Privacy Legislation is Not Needed-Yet, INFOWORLD DAiLY NEws, July 13, 1999,
available at 1999 WL 10504347.
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the site will not need to first notify the user and seek consent. And, of
course, nor will it need to offer some new consideration to the user in re-
turn for its use of the new data. These are significant benefits of avoiding
privacy policies. The FTC is wrong to suggest that these concrete benefits
would be outweighed by an amorphous and speculative promise of greater
consumer willingness to participate in electronic commerce.
Next, consider the situation once the FTC promulgates the fair infor-
mation practice principles.
FIGURE 4:
WEBSITE INDUSTRY WITH FAIR
INFORMATION PRACTICE PRINCIPLES
Large Websites
Privacy Policy I No Privacy Policy
Small
Websites
Privacy Policy 1,2 1,1
No Privacy Policy 2,2 2,1
In this situation, large websites do better for respecting privacy than
not respecting privacy, regardless of what the small or medium websites
do. They receive 2, representing their most preferred outcome, in the
northwest and southwest cells. They receive the same payoff in each of
these boxes, indicating their relative indifference to the actions of the
small and medium websites. It is enough for each of the large sites that it
individually benefits from conforming. This is plausible as these sites are
prominent and they would run the risk of coming under FTC scrutiny for
questionable, albeit legal, trade practices, were they to fail to make a re-
spectable effort to show respect for user privacy, as newly spelled out by
the FTC, in its fair information practice principles.
In contrast, small websites would plausibly have a dominating prefer-
ence to not provide privacy policies. Because they are small, they will be
able to fly under the FTC's radar. The FTC merely has outlined the prin-
ciples that it contends are fair. It did not mandate them. Accordingly, the
small sites receive a higher payoff in either of the southern cells, as com-
pared to the northern cells. Note that the southwest cell is an equilibrium,
that is, given the choices of others, no actor could unilaterally have done
better. Thus, the situation in which large websites respect privacy and
small sites do not, will tend to be stable.
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Consider next the situation in which the FTC issues its threat to the
website industry. The major websites are no longer indifferent to the ac-
tions of the smaller sites, for the failure of these sites to adopt privacy-
respecting practices might lead to privacy legislation, which would ad-
versely affect all websites, but particularly the large sites, as they have the
most to lose from onerous legislative requirements. The major online
firms are mega-corporations with some of the largest market capitaliza-
tions in history. The strategic situation once the industry-wide threat is in
place is represented in the following payoff matrix:
FIGURE 5:
WEBSITE INDUSTRY AFTER F'C THREAT
Large Websites
Privacy Policy No Privacy Policy
Small Privacy Policy 2,4 1,2
Websites
No Privacy Policy 4,3 3,1
Note that there is no longer a stable equilibrium in this situation.
Large sites most prefer the northwest cell while small sites prefer the
southwest cell. In contrast to the previous situation, as represented in Fig-
ure 4, the large sites now prefer that the small sites respect privacy. This is
because the FTC has made it clear that it expects industry-wide improve-
ment and that if this is not forthcoming, a statute will be forthcoming.
Thus, the large sites now prefer the northwest to the southwest cell. For
any particular small site, however, it will still prefer to defect in order to
reap the benefits of unrestrained data collection and use. If the larger sites
become more respectful of privacy, this may serve a particular small site's
interests as there will be less pressure from the FTC on the website indus-
try generally. But the small site will nevertheless do better still if it can
successfully free ride on this public good. Thus, the small website's high-
est payoff comes in the southwest cell, in which it does not provide a
privacy policy but the large websites do.
Faced with this situation, large sites devised a means to bring small
sites into conformity with more respectful data collection practices. Large
sites began threatening to withhold advertising from sites that did not
[Vol. 7:97
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demonstrate adequate respect for privacy.4 This is apparently contribut-
ing toward the desired result as an increasing number of small sites are
now offering privacy policies. Indeed, as indicated by the FTC's 1999
Report to Congress, website provision of privacy policies has gone up
significantly. Regarding the issuance of threats by large websites, the FTC
writes:
Companies like IBM, Microsoft and Disney, which have recently
announced, among other things, that they will forego advertising
on sites that do not adhere to fair information practices are to be
commended for their efforts, which we hope will be emulated by
their colleagues.'4'
The FTC, then, is able to indirectly promote its goal of data privacy
by getting large websites to do its bidding.
Note that when large websites threaten to withhold advertising from
small sites, the effectiveness of the threat does not depend on repeated
interaction between the parties. Even if the small websites only interact
once with Microsoft or BM, they will typically prefer that this interaction
allow for advertising rather than that it not. In the terminology of informal
game theory then, the instrumental allocation of advertising is functioning
like a "selective incentive" that rewards cooperative behavior on an indi-
vidual basis.'42 Selective incentives allow the party seeking to incentivize
conformity to be able to provide incentives to individuals in order to elicit
their conformity. This is in contrast to the collective good itself, which, by
definition, has the feature that the good is public, that is, when provided
for one, it is provided for all, and thus is open to free riding.
Note that this type of selective incentive cannot be expected to work
for all small sites. Some small sites will have little prospect of receiving
advertising revenue from large sites and may stand to benefit significantly
from the unfettered use of personal data. These sites may continue to have
a dominating preference to free ride on the growing practice of providing
privacy policies. The net result of the threats instigated by the FTC and
carried forward by the large sites, then, is a bi-normative world in which
large sites and some small sites are respectful of privacy while other small
sites are not. The important and difficult issue, then, for future scholarship
on website privacy norms is whether and how additional small sites might
come to show greater respect for privacy.
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140. 1999 FTC REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 4, at 12-13.
141. Id.
142. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECITVE ACTION (1965).
143. Recently, software vendors have begun marketing so-called "privacy-solutions."
For example, Zero-Knowledge Systems lets Internet users surf the net anonymously. See
Tech Leaders of the Year; They're Young; They're Aggressive; They're Taking on the World.
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CONCLUSION
This article has developed a case study of the emergence of website
privacy norms. In the short history of the Internet, there has been a major
shift-a norm cascade-toward norms that are more respectful of privacy
and more efficient. The transition has been from a wild-west world in
which websites acted with near impunity in collecting whatever personal
data they could, to a world in which a significant percentage of websites
are explicitly addressing privacy concerns.
Like other case studies in the law and norms tradition, the goal here
has been two-fold. First, to utilize a theoretical framework to model a
complex and important social phenomenon, namely, the evolving rela-
tionship between websites and their visitors vis-a-vis data privacy.
Second, to learn more about the theory of law and norms itself, by coming
to better understand its powers and limitations in an important applied
context. In particular, the most significant theoretical feature of the fore-
going account was the study of the complex and complimentary roles
played by various norm entrepreneurs.
Part I first looked at the original privacy norms that emerged at the
Web's inception in the early 1990s. Two groups have been the main con-
tributors to the emergence of these norms; the thousands of commercial
websites on the early Web, on the one hand, and the millions of users of
the early Web, on the other hand. The norms originally created by the in-
teraction of websites and consumers had the problem that they created
significant negative externalities for consumers, as commercial websites
were rampantly extracting personal data with little or no concern for the
And They're Just Getting Started, PROFIT, Nov. 2000, at 73; see also Company Chosen from
Elite Group of Industry Players to Present Its Internet Privacy Solution, PR Newswire, Oct.
27, 2000. Privacy Solutions typically come in the form of software that users, websites, or
both can install in order to create a more private online environment. John Graubert & Jill
Coleman, Consumer Protection and Antitrust Enforcement at the Speed of Light: The FTC
Meets the Internet, 25 CAN. U.S. L.J. 275, 290 (1999) ("In the case of Internet privacy, sev-
eral technologies potentially capable of protecting the online privacy of consumers are
evidently already on the market or under development. Technology-based privacy solutions
may eventually provide consumers with the confidence and security that they need to con-
duct business on the Internet on a global scale."); ZDWIRE, P3P: Just a Start, July 17, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 18178259 ("There's no disputing that privacy has emerged as a lead-
ing issue of the Internet age. A whole industry is springing up around it, with software and
service providers rushing to offer the latest and greatest solution for protecting an individ-
ual's personal information and identity online."). There may remain websites that are not
reachable. But if there are a small enough number of such sites, this may be an acceptable
level of defection from acceptable norms. The hardest sites to reach are those that can com-
pletely externalize costs to consumers. These would be sites that would not have repeated
interactions with the same consumers and ones that would be able to avoid reputational
costs. For consumers might not even go to the site in the first place, if the site's reputation
was bad and widely known.
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privacy interests of their visitors. Part I then examined the strategic struc-
ture of the relationships between websites and consumers which permitted
these highly exploitative norms to develop. Consumers were seen to face
a large-scale collective action problem. There is a collective good that
consumers could potentially achieve, namely, the abatement of disrespect-
ful data-collection practices by websites. But consumers were not in a
position to organize in order to secure this collective good, due to their
large numbers, lack of repeat play and overlapping relationships. Not sur-
prisingly, then, the original website data-collection 'norms did not take
account of the privacy interests of website users.
Reacting to this undesirable social situation from the perspective of
consumers, "norm entrepreneurs" entered the picture to promote website
norms that would better serve consumers' privacy interests. Part II exam-
ined how improved website privacy norms have recently emerged, due to
the efforts of a number of different norm entrepreneurs. The activities of
these norm entrepreneurs were broken down into two main stages. In the
first stage, the privacy advocacy community and the website industry bat-
tled to define the appropriate set of aspirational norms that each group
thought should govern website/consumer interactions. The privacy advo-
cacy community applied its pre-existing second-order norms of data
privacy to the context of Internet websites. In response, the Website in-
dustry entered the arena in order to promote a competing set of norms that
were loss demanding on the industry. In the second stage, the FTC was
seen to adopt a set of privacy norms based on those proposed by the com-
peting norm entrepreneurs discussed in Stage One. The FTC then used
threats to induce websites to adopt these norms. The FTC created a large-
scale collective action problem for the website industry, where none has
existed before. It did this by creating a collective good that the industry
would be interested to promote: the avoidance of Congressional legisla-
tion. The agency threatened to push for legislation unless the industry
demonstrated greater respect for privacy.
In a later Stage-Two development, some of the large sites in turn
threatened to withhold advertising from smaller sites with whom they did
business if these sites were not more respectful of consumer privacy. The
result of this network of threats by the FTC and large websites was the
emergence of a new social equilibrium in which there was no longer a
uniform norm of disrespect for privacy as existed in Stage One, but in-
stead a bi-normative world in which numerous sites continued to conform
to disrespectful practices while many other sites adopted more respectful
practices. The emergence of the bi-normative equilibrium created favor-
able conditions for a new stage, which is beginning to develop. In this
stage, softvare firms have begun to sell "privacy solutions" to websites
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concerned to signal to consumers their respect for consumers' privacy, in
the hope that consumers will thereby give the sites their business. This
third stage is newly emerging and quickly gaining momentum.
It is important that we continue to make efforts to better understand
how privacy norms are emerging. First, we need to see if we can continue
to make progress in producing better website practices through predomi-
nantly informal means. While there have been significant improvements
to date, the current situation is unsatisfactory. By better understanding the
processes that have worked thus far to promote website privacy, we will
be in a better position to see if more progress may still be made, either
through previously utilized methods, or through new ones. With Congress
poised to act, it is important that we achieve this clarity now. In particular,
if better norms are already emerging through informal social processes,
and minimalist governmental guidance, there may not be a need for
sweeping legislation of the sort currently being proposed by many privacy
advocates.
